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The following lectures were delivered by me before the International Free Trade Alliance, in New York, in
the spring of 1876. They are here republished exactly as delivered, although there are certain points which I
should like to elaborate, if the opportunity were offered. I have endeavored here to combine two things: 1st,
the history of our own tariff legislation, showing its weakness, ignorance, confusion, and oscillation; and,
2d, a discussion of the arguments for and against free trade, as they have presented themselves in the indus-
trial and legislative history of the country. I have summed up in the last lecture the convictions to which such
a study of the subject must lead. Suffice it here to say, that when one clean one’s head of all the sophistries
and special pleas by which protection is usually defended, and looks at the matter as a simple matter of
common sense, one must be convinced that an industrious people on a fertile soil, so abundant in extent that
population is inadequate to the highest organization of labor, must enjoy advancing wealth and prosperity.
They will owe this to a diligent use of their natural advantages. They will reach the maximum of production
when they produce and exchange most freely. Certainly no application of taxation can possibly increase
their production; that is their national wealth. Every tax or other interference with the freedom of production
or exchange produces restraint, confusion, delay, change, risk and vexation, and these, as every one knows,
cause loss of time, labor, and capital, that is, diminish the product which may be obtained from a given
amount of labor. The amount of this loss can never be measured in figures, because we can never get
statistics of “what might have been;” but when it is shown here that the legislation of the United States has
been constantly vacillating, not only in its policy, but also in the degree to which its policy has been pursued;
that it has laid burdens on production and exchange in a clumsy, brutal, and ignorant disregard of possible
effects on the delicate network of modern industry; that it has had in view, from point to point, only a single
interest, and has had no national stand-point or conception of the public interest (much as it boasts to the
contrary); then, I think, any one must see that such legislation has lamed the national productive power,
wasted the natural advantages which the nation enjoys, diminished its wealth, and contracted the general
status of comfort for the whole people.
Adam Smith laid down four rules by which all taxes ought to be tested. Experience has ratified them so
thoroughly that they are no longer questioned by anybody. They ought to be known by everybody.
1. Taxes should be, as far as practicable, equal.
2. They should be definite in amount (not uncertain or variable).
3. They should be collected, so far as possible, at the time most convenient to the payer, so as not to
cripple the process of production.
4. They should be so arranged as to give the maximum revenue to the government at the minimum cost
to the people, i.e., they should cost as little as possible to collect; and they should keep capital oat of the6 / William Graham Sumner
hands of the people as short time as possible.
Protective taxes are hostile to revenue, because the purpose of a protective tax is to prevent importa-
tions. The moment, however, that a tax begins to have this effect it prevents revenue. Hence, where protec-
tion begins, there revenue ends.
There is no conceivable ground of right by which the legislature may decide what things ought to be
produced, and in what measure, and then use its taxing power to carry out its notions. Every tax is an evil,
and it is on the defensive. Its need must be shown, and no tax can be defended which is laid for anything but
revenue to defray the legitimate and necessary cost of public peace, order, and security.
For taxes laid to this end, some further roles can now be laid down as established by long experience.
1. No such taxes should be allowed to act protectively to any degree. They should be offset by excise
taxes of equivalent amount.
2. They should be laid on as few articles as possible, and in the simplest way possible (to avoid expense
in collection).
3. The legislator should try to find the maximum revenue point on each article (i.e., If there were no tax
there would be no revenue. If there were a prohibitory tax there would be no revenue. There is a point
between, at which the highest revenue can be obtained with the least cost and the least fraud).
4. Raw materials should not be taxed. (It is not easy to define “raw materials,” but the rule has value as
a practical rule. Taxes on raw materials strangle industry at its birth.)
These rules are only practical rules, derived from experience. There arc no scientific laws of taxation,
because there are no natural laws of taxation. Nature has not provided for taxation, as she has for production,
exchange, distribution, and consumption. Taxation is part of the co-operation of society for its own defense
against the evil and destructive forces within itself. Any state which lays protective taxes misuses the means
of defense to increase the evils.
W. G. S.Lecture I: The National Idea and the American System.
It is a sign of a dogma in dissolution to change its form and to yield points of detail, while striving to guard
its vested interests and traditional advantages. Just now the dogma of protection is striving to find standing
ground, after a partial retreat, for a new defense, in the doctrine of nationality. We are told that there is only
a “national” and not a “political” economy, that there are no universal laws of exchange, consequently no
science of political economy; that it is only an art, and has only an empirical foundation, and that it varies
with national circumstances to such a degree as to be controlled by nothing higher than traditional policy or
dogmatic assumption. Great comfort is fonnd for this position in the assertion that the German economists
have discovered or adopted its truth. How utterly unjust and untrue this is as a matter of fact, those who have
read the works of the German economists must know. It is untrue, in the first place, that they are unani-
mously of the school of the socialistes en chaire, and, in the second place, it is untrue that the socialistes en
chaire are clear and unanimous in their position. They occupy every variety of position, from extreme
willingness to entrust the state with judgment in the application of economical prescriptions, to the greatest
conservatism in that regard. Finally, it is not true that any of them are protectionists.
We do not intend, however, to discuss the opinion or authority of the schools in question. If it should be
claimed that the extreme admission made by some of the Germans of this school, that protection may be
beneficial to a nation at a certain stage of development, is applicable to the United States to-day, we should
desire no better footing for the controversy.
It is more directly interesting, however, to examine the doctrine of nationality on its merits. It will
appear upon even a cursory examination of this kind, that existing nations are arbitrary and traditional
divisions. There was published in Europe, in 1863, when the Emperor Napoleon was urging on an attempt to
secure stable equilibrium in European politics by adjusting political divisions according to race and lan-
guage divisions, a map of Europe thus rationally constructed. The effort, however, offered the most striking
proof of the impossibility of reconstructing, on any such rationalistic or logical basis, political circum-
stances, which are the historical outgrowth of political struggles and political accidents. The nations which
must be made the subject of discussion are, therefore, such as exist, and of them it is true that their bounda-
ries coincide with no lines of race, language, culture, industry, commerce, or anything else which would give
the basis of scientific classification, so that different principles could be consistently applied in each. There
was a time, indeed, when the civil subdivisions were small and numerous—when manners, customs, cos-
tumes and language varied over every hundred square miles of Europe—but the whole tendency of the great
inventions of modern times is to obliterate these boundary lines for purposes of industry and trade.
It is not necessary to go into the history of Europe for proofs and illustrations. The very best are
furnished by our own continent and our own nation. The geographical area known to-day as the United8 / William Graham Sumner
States is the result of discovery, conquest and purchase. It would have been impossible a century ago to
constitute an empire of such extent, and to govern it according to the requirements of modern life. The
improvements in transportation and the transmission of intelligence have made it physically possible, and
the combination of local institutions with a centralized organization has made it politically possible.
When we turn to inquire, however, why it has been limited just as it has, why Canada and Mexico are
outside, and why Texas, California and Alaska are within, we come at once to the historical antecedents
which are partly accidents and partly ancient struggles and hostilities. Canada was never made thoroughly
English before the revolutionary war; while it was French it was always hostile to the English colonies. This
hostility was traditional, and there was no sympathy with the revolution. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia
were largely peopled by the Tory refugees, whom the unwise severity of the Whigs forced to emigrate
during and after the war. Texas was won from Mexico in war. California and the other Pacific States were
obtained partly by conquest and partly by purchase. A few years ago we discussed a plan for purchasing San
Domingo. Out of these historical movements, part of which fell out one way and part the other, the actual
geographical limits of the United States result.
Now, according to the Constitution of the United States, no one of these States can make any laws
restricting commerce between itself and any of the others. If it be asserted that states which pursue different
industries cannot afford to trade freely with one another, here we have them—New York and Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts and Minnesota, Maine and Louisana. If it be asserted that states with like industries cannot
afford to trade freely with one another, here we have them—Indiana and Illinois, Iowa and Minnesota,
Massachusetts and Rhode Island, Alabama and Mississippi. If it be said that small States cannot afford to
trade freely with great empires, here are New York and Connecticut, Pennsylvania and Delaware. Why do
not the great states suck the life out of the small ones? If it be said that new states with little capital, and on
the first stage of culture, cannot afford to exchange freely with old states having large capital and advanced
social organization, here are New York and Oregon, Massachusetts and Idaho. How can any territories ever
grow into states under the pressure? If it be said that a state which relies on one industry cannot afford to
exchange freely with one which has a diversified industry, here are Pennsylvania and Colorado, California
and Nevada, any of the cotton states and any of the north-eastern states. No such strong illustrations are
furnished by any states in the world which are sovereign and independent of each other. The Constitution of
the Union enforces absolute freedom of exchanges, and each state pays its own taxes and supports its own
government. The traveler rarely knows when he passes from one state to another. As to what he bays or
where he buys, what he sells or where he sells, it would be considered an unwarrantable impertinence for any
public official to inquire. Yet no man has ever been known, so far as we are aware, to complain of this as a
hardship, or as imposing a loss upon him, and no such complaint has arisen from any state as a state, nor has
any one been heard to claim that there was here an actual loss, which must be endured for the sake of the
great benefits which come from Union. On the contrary, it is universally and tacitly agreed that this is one of
the great benefits of the Union.
Here, however, comes in another phase of the matter. If a man lives in Vermont he must trade freely
with New Hampshire, Massachusetts and New York, but if he wants to trade northward to Canada, it is
regarded as fatal to him and to his country, that he should do so freely. As we won Texas from Mexico, we
enter into absolute free trade with her, but we think that it would be ruinous to trade freely with the rest of the
ancient state of Mexico. If we had got the political jurisdiction of San Domingo, we should have entered into
free exchanges with her, but the difficulty of the political jurisdiction was the main ground of the wise
decision of the nation not to buy that island. If, however, we cannot have the trouble of the political jurisdic-
tion, we think it would be calamitous to have the free exchanges. Free exchanges with Cuba are not to beLectures on the History of Protection in the United States / 9
thought of on our part, even if they would be granted on hers.
Here, then, the refutation of the “nationality” notion is right before us, and it is at the same time the
condemnation of our policy in regard to foreign commerce. If there be any such thing as an “American
system”—a system which we can claim to illustrate and advocate before the civilized world, it must be that
of absolute free trade, each state or nation providing for its own needs and expenses, each state freely open
to all comers, securing peace and safety to persons and property while within its borders.
The “British system” is different, and is distinctly defined. It is to raise revenue by customs for conven-
ience, and to lay excises to counteract “incidental protection.” We would be very glad to see the British
system introduced into this country, but if the protectionists taunt freetraders with flinching from the conse-
quences of their doctrine, we accept the challenge. We are convinced by the experience of the United States,
that the best system would be to have absolutely free exchanges, and to leave each nation to pay the expense
of maintaining the organization of society within its own borders.
Another application of the facts here discussed which is put to us, is deserving of far less respectful
treatment. It is said that we have free trade already within the Union, and that we are discontented and
unreasonable, because we demand more. It would be difficult to show why a man who has ten thousand
dollars should not sue for ten thousand more which are due him, or why a man who enjoys the right of
locomotion is unreasonable in demanding the right of association.
There is in all that we have said no infringement upon the true idea of the “nation,” and no derogation
from its value and dignity. It exists historically and traditionally, and we take it as it is handed down to us. It
is an organized human society, whose limits are given historically, and are maintained for convenience,
because they allow play to certain local interests, prejudices, traditions, habits and customs. Whether it is
formed by accident and immemorial tradition, or by colonization and legislative act, it develops an organic
life. The society as such develops functions. Its harmonious action emanates from its individual members
and reacts upon them. Its government is the machinery by which harmony, co-operation and unity are brought
about. It would seem, however, that America had done its greatest service to the world by showing that states
did not exist for the sake of bringing men into convenient groups for making either commercial or military
war upon each other, but that they might more easily embrace the earth in a family of harmonious commu-
nities.Lecture II: Broad Principles Underlying the Tariff
Controversy.
The world has heard a great deal about liberty for the last century. That period has been marked by great
struggles on the part of nations to secure independence, and on the part of classes and individuals to secure
freedom from old traditional restraints. The world has struggled towards “freedom” and “liberty” as if these
were the first considerations of peace, justice, prosperity and happiness, and the result has been to produce,
in the forefront of modern civilization, states whose fundamental principle is to give the freest scope to
individual energy and effort.
We in the United States make it our greatest boast that we have accepted this broad principle abso-
lutely, and applied it fearlessly; nevertheless, we, who are met here to-night, are associated to demand more
liberty. There is no body of our fellow-citizens worth mentioning who deny the right and the expediency of
private property. What we have to demand, and what the majority of our fellow-citizens—so far aa their will
has yet been constitutionally expressed—deny us, is the privilege of using our property as we like, that is, of
exchanging it when and where and with whomsoever we will. When we demand this privilege, which be-
longs to us on the simplest principles of right reason and common sense, we are met by a speculative theory
based on artificial assumptions, put forward sometimes on bare considerations of selfish interest, and some-
times with no little parade of abstract philosophizing. We are told, “Oh, no! It is not best for the state that you
should do as you like about making your exchanges. The legislature must consider the question, and pre-
scribe for you with whom and for what you shall exchange. If you deal with the designated persons, your
countrymen, they will gain, the wealth of the communty will increase, and you, as a member of the commu-
nity, will participate, and be better off in the end than if you had been let alone.”
Now, we dispute this theory at every stage. We deny that the state, i.e., the legislature, can make any
such provision for us better than we can make for ourselves, and we appeal to experience of everything it
tries to do; we deny that it has any business to theorize for us in the premises; we deny that the designated
persons will gain—at least, that they will gain as much as they would if they were left to deal with us on their
own footing; we deny that they can gain anything from us, on account of the law, but what we lose; we deny
that the total gains to one part of society by this process can ever exceed the total losses of another part, i.e.,
that the process can increase the wealth of the community; we deny, finally, that our share of these hypo-
thetical gains can ever be redistributed to us so as to bring back our first loss. We have never seen money go
through such a process, passing through many hands, and come back whole, to say nothing of loss and waste.
Thus the issue is joined. On the one side are broad and simple principles, so elementary that they are
mere truisms, and on the other side are special pleas of various kinds set up to befog men’s judgment andLectures on the History of Protection in the United States / 11
prevent them from drawing the inferences which follow inevitably.
Let me suggest to you two or three ot the broadest and most commanding principles which really decide this
question:
1. We, Americans, have made it the first principle of oar society that no man shall obtain by law any
advantage in the race of life on account of birth or rank, or any traditional or fictitious privilege of any kind
whatsoever, and on the other hand, we have removed, so far as the law can remove, all the hindrances and
stumbling blocks which come from circumstances of birth and family. Society gives no aid, hut it removes all
obstacles of social prejudice and tradition. There is not a man in the country who does not respond with a full heart
to the wisdom and truth of this relation of society to the individual. Now, on what principle is this relation based?
It is on the belief that society makes the most of its members in that way. Some men have more in them than
others. We do not know which is which nntil they show it; bnt we believe that the way to let each one come to nis
best, is for society to set them all on their feet, and then let them run each for himself. We believe that the best
powers of the community are brought out in that way.
It does not follow that men so treated never make mistakes, and never ruin themselves. We see them do this
every day; hut if it were proposed that the state should interfere, few would be led astray by the proposition.
The same principle applies to trade directly and completely. The productive powers of men and communi-
ties differ, but whatever they are, more or less, they reach their maximum under liberty. The total of national
wealth is greatest where each disposes of his own energy in production and exchange with the least interference.
This is not saying that none will make mistakes, or that free trade will eliminate all ills from human life. Free trade
will not make the idle enjoy the fruits of industry, nor the thriftless possess the rewards of economy. Poverty,
pain, disease, misery will remain as long as idleness and vice remain. Free trade will only act in its own measure
and way, to leave men face to face with these things, with a somewhat better chance to conquer them.
It is one of the great vices of protection that it makes the industrious suffer for the idle, and the energetic and
enterprising bear the losses of the stupid.
2. If, now, you examine the opposite theory you will find that it assumes that we or our ancestors all made
a great mistake in coming to this country and trying to live here. We are told that a tariff is necessary to “make a
market” for our farmers, that a tariff is necessary to keep our manufactures from destruction, that navigation laws
are necessary to preserve our shipping. Some of the old countries support a population twenty or thirty times as
dense as ours with little or nothing of this artificial system. If, then, we are not able to live here without this aid, we
must have left a part of the world where life is easier for one where it is harder. This brings me, then,
3. To the great fundamental error of the theory, viz.: That taxation is a productive force. No emigrants go to
the desert of Sahara. None would go to New York if it were sand and rocks. If, however, New York is a part of the
earth’s surface, consisting of arable land fit to produce food for man; if it is intersected by mountains, covered by
forests, and containing iron and coal, and if it possesses great rivers and a splendid harbor, then the conditions of
supporting human life are fulfilled. It requires only labor and capital to bnild up there a great and prosperous
community. It is plain that some parts of the earth’s surface contain more materials for man’s use than others, and
the fact as to New York will affect the wealth of its inhabitants. It is plain that it makes a difference whether the
people are idle or industrious, listless or energetic, sluggish or enterprising. It is plain that it makes a difference
how much capital they have, or whether there are enough of them for the best distribution of labor. It is plain that
it makes a difference what is the state of the arts and sciences, and what are the facilities of transportation.
The wealth of New York at any given time must depend on the way in which these factors are com-
bined. Now the question arises: How can taxation possibly increase the product? Which one of the factors
does it act upon?
Just consider what taxation is. We pay taxes, in the first place, to pay for the necessary organization of12 / William Graham Sumner
society, in order that we may act together, and not at cross purposes like a mob; but if that were all the state
had to do taxes would be very small. We must support courts and police, and army and navy. These we need
for peace, and justice, and security. But suppose that there were none who had the will to rob, or to swindle,
or to cheat, or to do violence, the expenditures under this head Would dwindle to nothing. It follows that
taxes are the tribute we pay to avarice, and violence, and rapine, and all the other vices which disfigure
human nature. Taxes are only those evils translated into money and spread over the community. They are so
much taken from the strength of the laborer, or the fertility ot the soil, or the benefit cf the climate. They are
loss and waste to almost their entire extent.
This is the function of government then, which it is proposed to use to create value, to do what men can
do only by applying labor and capital to land. Let us take a case to test it. Let us suppose that no woolen cloth
is made in New York, but that a New York farmer, at the end of a certain time, has ten bushels of wheat, of
which one bushel will buy a yard of imported cloth. After the exchange then he has nine bushels of wheat
and one yard of cloth. If any one could make cloth in New York as easily as he could raise a bushel of wheat,
some one would do it as soon as there was unemployed labor and capital, and that would be the end of the
matter; but if no one undertakes the business it must be because labor and capital are all employed, or
bccanse it takes more labor and capital to produce a yard of cloth than a bushel of wheat Let us suppose that
it would take as much as a bushel and a half of wheat. Now, a protectionist proposes to the state to tax
imported cloth one-half bushel of wheat per yard. If his plan is carried out the difficulty of obtaining im-
ported cloth is raised to one bushel and a half of wheat per yard, which is the rate of difficulty at which it can
be produced in New York. The protectionist then begins and offers his cloth at a bushel and a half per yard.
The farmer who, as before, has produced ten bushels, now buys at the new rate, and after the exchange stands
possessed of eight and a half bushels of wheat and one yard of cloth. Whither has the other half bushel gone?
It has gone to make up a fund to hire some men to make life in New York harder than God and nature made
it From time to time we are told how much “our industries have increased.” So far as their increase is in fact
due to this arrangement, it is only a proof how much mischief has been done. This application of taxation
does not alter the nature of taxation, it only extends its effects arbitrarily and needlessly, and inflicts upon the
people a greater measure than they need otherwise bear of the burden which is due to robbery, injustice, war,
famine and the other social ills.
4. Protection is, moreover, hostile to improvements. We are always eager to devise improved methods
and to invent machinery to “save labor,” but every such improvement which we introduce involves the waste
and destruction of a great deal of capital. Old machinery must be discarded, although it is not worn out This
loss is not incurred by anybody willingly; it is enforced by competition. When, therefore, competition is
withdrawn or limited the incentive to improvement is lessened or destroyed. This applies especially in
manufactures where the international competition is cat off by protective duties. The same principle that
protection resists improvement applies even more distinctly to those improvements which are made in trans-
portation. In spite of their theories men rejoice in all the improved means of communication which bring
nations nearer together. A new railroad or an improved steamship a regarded as a step gained in civilization.
Such improvements are realized in diminished freights and diminished prices of imported goods. No sooner
is this realized, however, than “foreign competition” is found to to worse than ever. An outcry goes up for
“more protection,” and a new tax is put on to-day to counteract what we rejoiced over yesterday as an
immense gain. We spend millions to dredge oat our harbors, to remove rocks and cat channels through
sandbars, as if it were a gain to have communication inward and outward as free as possible, and as soon as
we experience the effects in reduced cost of goods we lay a new tax, like restoring the sandbars, in order to
undo our work. Indeed, to build sandbars across our harbors would be a far cheaper means of reaching theLectures on the History of Protection in the United States / 13
same end. Next, we find that the numerous and complicated taxes have made it impossible for as to build
ships to sail across the ocean where they mast come in competition with foreign ships; so we make naviga-
tion acts and forbid the purchase of ships, exclude foreigners from our coasting-trade, and finally, propose
bounties and subsidies, all of which must come at last oat of the products of oar labor, in order to try to get
ships once more. It is like the man who cut a piece from his coat to mend his trowsers, a piece from his vest
to replace the hole in his coat, a piece from his trowsers to restore his vest, and so on over again. Did he ever
get a whole suit? He found in a little while that he had only a rag left.
We are told, however, that if we do not do all this we shall be “inundated” with foreign goods. The
word is appalling, and carries with it a fallacy which often seems to have great power. On what terms shall
we get this flood of good things? Will they be given to us? If so, what can we do better than to stop work and
live on this generosity? Why are we, however, selected as the especial objects of this bounty, if bounty it is?
Why do not England and France and Belgium and Germany pour out their inundations on Patagonia and
Iceland? The answer is plain enough. The goods are not gifts, they arc offered for exchange. Nothing can
force as to buy or dictate terms of exchange; and the inundation comes to us because we are known to be rich
and able, and because we inhabit a continent prolific in some of the chiet objects of human desire. It is not
the beggar who, when he goes down the street, is “inundated” with wares from the various stores. If it were
he would probably stem the tide with joy. It is the rich man only to whom good things are freely offered with
a well understood condition; few rich men have ever been heard to complain of it. If, then, the Americans
have these good things offered them in exchange and they allow themselves to be worsted in the bargain,
they sadly belie their reputation.
These few observations which I have now presented as bearing on this subject are very broad and
comprehensive, and very sweeping in their effect. They appeal directly to common sense and right reason.
They give us the correct point of view, and dispel some of the fog which has collected from habit and
prejudice around this subject. They lead us right np to the doctrine which the United States have put in
practice in their own internal trade—absolute freedom ot exchange and local or internal taxation. We have
proved the practical value of that system here over a continent. I cannot see why the same system would not
be a great gain if extended over Canada, Mexico and the “West Indies. I cannot see why it would not be a
great gaia if all South America were embraced in a confederation exactly like ours as far as this point is
concerned, with absolute free trade between the states. I cannot see why all Europe would not gain by similar
relations, as far as trade is concerned; and I see no reason why it should not be equally beneficent if extended
to the whole civilized globe.
The objections come in the shape of stubborn prejudices and old errors attaching to narrow and special
considerations. Some people dread the sweep of a great general principle, however clear and certain and
scientific it may be. They dispose of it as a “theory.” Well, I am a theorist. I accept the disabilities and
demand the advantages of my position; and when I find a great principle founded in an observation of facts
and experience, I am not afraid to follow it up to its last corollary. The statesman must do what he can in the
face of tradition and prejudice and vested interests, and I presume that it will be fong before the public will
be so enlightened as to demand to feel every cent that it pays in taxes for the very sake of knowing the
amount, but I am clear in regard to the wisdom of such an arrangement.
In the further lectures which I am to give I propose to treat the subject historically for I believe that the
tariff history of the United States shows most clearly some of the worst of the evils of the system, and I think
that every one ought to know how this system has grown up and been fastened upon us.Lecture III: The Origin of Protection in this Country.
The war of American Independence was a revolt against unjust taxation. In the same year the Declaration of
Independence was adopted, and Adam Smith published his “Wealth of Nations.” They were two revolts, one
political, the other scientific, against the prevailing dogmas of the mercantile system of political economy.
They were twin incidents in the revolt of modern life against the traditions of the middle age. It is at once a
pity and a surprise that the last century has seen their developments diverge instead of combining.
The revolt of the American colonies was against the “colonial system,” which was itself only a part of
a grand theory about the relations of nations as regards trade. According to this theory, nations were to be
isolated from each other. They were not regarded as merely groups in the body of mankind, having common
interests, but as distinct and separate bodies, having hostile interests, and ruled in their relations to one
another by jealousy, suspicion and desire for plunder. Civilization had advanced so far that these motives
were regarded inside the nation as barbarous and injurious, but they still prevailed in international relations.
In regard to trade, it was believed that its object was to get possession of money—precious metals—that this
was wealth, and that only one party to an exchange could gain by it It naturally followed that complicated
laws were made to control trade and drive it into the forms which men thought wiser and better than those of
nature. Export duties were laid on raw materials to make them cheap; bounties were laid on exports of
manufactured goods in order to increase exports; duties were laid on imports to diminish them; prohibitions
were laid on the exportation of specie, or on the exportation of machinery, or on the emigration of laborers.
Navigation laws, including discriminating duties and tonnage taxes were passed. All this belonged to the
great system: the effect was to isolate nations, to rob them of each other’s gains in literature and the arts and
sciences, and to cut off all that highest development which comes from the action of states on states.
When this system was complete and the barriers were established, nations began to put in special gates,
well defended, at which they agreed to let each other in and out for special forms of trade, at particular times
»nd under strict regulations. We ask, in astonishment, if this was trade; if men really believed that trade must
be watched and restrained in this way. We see that the private trader cannot make his place of business too
attractive, nor set the door too wide open, nor make the approach too easy, nor be too indifferent as to who
comes, or how, provided he comes for honest trade. But the method we here find in use suggests on!v dread,
suspicion and war. The machinery is that of a fortress, not tbac of a market
The colonial system was only a part of this system. When the old States had all been thus isolated they
began to seek possessions in the new world, with which each for itself could hold free trade but exclude all
others. That is, foreign commerce was, after all, a good thing, and free trade was a good thing, if you could
hold the foreign nation in subjection and coerce all its relations. If the colony could be used for the interest
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weakness, that if the colony ever got strong enough it would not endure this warping of all its energies in one
direction, but would get independence in order to come into free relations with other nations besides its
mother country. Such is the actual meaning of the American war of independence.
It would seem natural that the emancipated colonies would seek free intercourse with all uations, and
it is a very curious study to see how this logical tendency conflicted for years after the revolution with
inherited traditions and prejudices. On the 6th February, 1778, Gerard, Franklin, Deane and Lee made a
treaty of alliance and also a treaty of commerce between France and the United States. In the latter treaty it
was agreed to avoid “all those burthensome prejudices which are usually sources of debate, embarrassment
and discontent,” and to take as the “basis of their agreement the most perfect equality and reciprocity.” They
further refer to the general principle by which they were guided as that of “founding the advantage of
commerce solely upon reciprocal utility and the just rules of free intercourse.” Up to this time the principle
of treaties of commerce had been that two nations made an agreement to give each other special and exclu-
sive privileges. The Americans introduced this much of a new principle, that they would not enter into those
complicated relations by which Europe, after having cut off all natural relations, had set up special, narrow,
arbitrary and artificial relations between nations, but that they would hold themselves open to the freest
relations they could establish with all parts of the old world.
Hence we find their representatives abroad eagerly pushing, at every opportunity, for chances to estab-
lish commercial relations. They met with all kinds of obstacles. Old habit had accustomed nations to deal
with their own colonies only. They had no idea what good things the North American colonies could offer.
The habit of suspicion was strong. The prevailing notions of trade led them to apprehend dangers rather than
advantages from trade. On the other hand, as it had generally been believed that England had gained great
advantages from her colonies, there was great eagerness to get a share in those advantages now that they
were free and open, if only the aspirants had been able to find out what those advantages were and how to
obtain them.
It is strange to read the correspondence of the American agents abroad, and to see how they argued and
discussed with grave ambassadors about the “loss” which one nation would suffer in trading with another,
any shipment of specie one way or the other being regarded as an infallible sign of loss. The Americans were
by no means clear in their ideas, and did not combat these notions on principle, but apparently coincided in
them. They sought equality and reciprocity, but they never rose to the height of the only true doctrine. In an
exchange both parties win, or else obviously one would refuse to trade. If then one party puts obstacles in the
way, the total gain is diminished, the diminution probably being divided. If the ether party creates an obsta-
cle, the gain is still further diminished or destroyed. It is a matter of regret therefore when one party is guilty
of this folly, but it only doubles the mischief, and still further injures the other, if he likewise perpetrates the
same folly. This is the answer to the well worn and stubborn notion that free trade must be reciprocal, or
would be good if all nations would adopt it. One nation which adopts free trade gets more than it would if it
pat on restraints, even though all other nations may have restraints. It will share the gain if they follow its
example, for the gain is multiplied at every step, but, even while they hold back, it gains as much as it can
and makes the best of a bad state of things, while waiting for them to come to a better mind, if it adopts
freedom. What would be thought of a grocer who refused to trade with the hatter who would sell him the best
hats at the lowest price, because the hatter did not buy flour and sugar of him?
The American ministers had little success in their efforts to make treaties such as I have described. The
one with England was the one most eagerly desired. Under the prevailing notions the English had expected
to suffer immense losses by the separation, but habit and the excellence of English, goods revived trade
immediately after the war, and the trade was found at good as ever. A treaty which would have been eagerly16 / William Graham Sumner
seized in 1782 was refused in 1785. They did not care for any treaty.
Here we come to the first case in which currency errors became intertwined with errors as to foreign
trade, a junction which has run through all onr history to the present moment and which has been proof
mischief. In 1781, after the downfall of the continental currency, specie became very abundant here, being
bought by both French and English. The States, however, still had vast quantities of paper afloat. As soon as
the war ended this specie was all exported and expended in the purchase of goods long missed. The export of
specie in 1783 was ten millions. The import of goods from England in 1785 was 10 millions, and the exports
3.9 millions. In 1770 the imports were 8.5 millions, and the exports 4.5 millions. This explains why the
English were so well satisfied with the revival of trade.
During the war many industries had sprung up to supply the wants of the people for manufactures
formerly imported. At the return of peace these industries were prostrated, and a cry began to be made at that
time that the country could not stand free trade, and that it must do as England had always done, that is,
imitate the old restrictive system. The real demand was that some way should be found by law to continue
upon the American people, by their own act, the evils which the war had inflicted on them. We shall see
more of this when we come to the tariff of 1816. Whatever may have been the effect of peace to destroy the
war mushrooms, we find that there were, in 1789, manufactures of iron, glass, paper and cloth here, which
were boasted of as strong and prosperous, and propositions were made by competent capitalists for mining
iron on a large scale in Pennsylvania, which fell only on account of the turbulency of the inhabitants and the
insecurity of titles.
While things were in this state, Adams wrote from England in great disgust at the rejection of his
treaty, and urged reprisals. He declared that we could get no treaty until we should set up restrictions, that is,
we were to put a hindrance in the way in order to make a bargain for getting English obstacles removed by
promising to remove ours. Massachusetts took this advice, but found that it drove trade away to Newport and
Portsmouth. Virginia did the same, and found that she had likewise benefited Maryland and North Carolina.
Meanwhile the government of the Confederation was falling to pieces, and was a pity and a laughing
stock. It had no revenues and could not pay instalments on its loans as they fell due, nor even the interest on
its debt. Misery was great throughout the country, owing to paper money and debt and the losses of war. The
people were discontented and rebellious, actual disorder occurring in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and North
Carolina. The Congress was begging the States to lay a uniform five per cent duty to provide a revenue for
the Confederation. The question of import tax was, therefore, bound up with the question of civil order,
protection to manufactures, foreign commercial relations, and the misery arising from bad currency at home.
Virginia having tried to come to an agreement with Maryland to enforce a common revenue system on the
great waters of those States, this was found to be impracticable without the cooperation of other States. This
led to the Congress of Annapolis in 1786, which was only a commercial convention, and which found no
better way to discharge the task it had undertaken than to recommend Congress to call another convention in
the following year to revise the Articles of Confederation; that is, to provide for a common revenue system,
and for “the regulation of commerce,” by giving the general government permanent power for those pur-
poses. The Convention, when it met, made a complete reconstruction of the Articles of Confederation and
gave us the present Constitution. You see, then, just how much truth there is in the assertion that the country
was ruined by free trade during the Confederation, and that the Constitution was made to give protection.
In the Constitutional Convention, the question of free trade came np under the form of a desire for a
navigation law, and it at once took a sectional form. The Eastern States wanted the Constitution chiefly in
order to get such a law. The Southernmost States wanted free trade. The positions of the two sections were
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was one of the compromises of the Constitution that the power to regulate commerce was inserted, together
with the allowance of the slave trade until 1808 (nnder the permission to tax slaves not over ten dollars per
head), and the prohibition of export duties.
No sooner did the House of representatives get a quorum than the subject of revenue came np, and no
sooner was the subject of revenue taken up than the question of protection was raised.
In the debate, Madison said:
“I own myself the friendof a very free system of commerce. If industry and labor are left to take their
own course they will generally be directed to those objects which are most productive, and that in a manner
more certain and direct than the wisdom of the most enlightened legislature could point out. Nor do I believe
that the national interest is more promoted by such legislative directions than the interest of the individuals
concerned. Yet I concede that exceptions exist to this general rule, important in themselves, and claiming the
particular attention of this committee. If America were to leave her ports perfectly free, and to make no
discrimination between vessels owned by citizens and those owned by foreigners, while other nations make
such discrimination, such a policy would go to exclude American shipping from foreign ports, and we
should be materially affected in one of our most important interests.”
Again, in reply to Fitzsimmons, of Pennsylvania, who wanted more protection, and wanted to discour-
age luxury, and made certain propositions to that end, he said: “Some of the propositions may be productive
of revenue, and some may protect our domestic manufactures, though the latter subject, which involves
some intricate questions, ought not to be too confusedly blended with the former.”
That is to say, he was one of those who believe that a doctrine can be true and its application unwise,
and he thought that the coercion to be exercised on somebody else by doing one’s self an injury was suffi-
cient cause for submitting to suffering. He also tried very hard, on this and subsequent occasions, but fortu-
nately in vain, to introduce discriminating duties as between the nations with which we had treaties and
those with which we had none.
Perhaps the most remarkable utterance which has ever been made in the discussion of this tariff ques-
tion was made by Fisher Ames in this debate of 1789. He said: “From the different situation of the manufac-
turers in Europe and America, encouragement is necessary. In Europe the artisan is driven to labor for his
bread. Stern necessity, with her iron rod, compels his exertion. In America, invitation and encouragement
are needed. Without them the infant manufacture droops, and those who might be employed in it seek with
success a competency from our cheap and fertile soil.” For a man to adduce the facts which are the grandest
argument on one side of the question as an argument on the other is not common, and that a man like Fisher
Ames could do it is a proof of the depth to which long rooted notions can affect a man’s mind. The argument
amounts to saying that it is so easy for laborers to get a living in America, that we must make it hard to get
a living here in order that work may be done. It states the protectionist position in America, however, with
great exactness. The cheap and fertile soil, by nature, holds out to men of the artisan class a competency in
return for moderate and easy labor. In order that they might be forced to work at manufactures, which were,
in the nature of things, less remunerative in a new country with boundless fertile soil, it was necessary to
curtail by artificial and legal arrangements the profits of agriculture. This is just what the tariff has done
from 1789 until this day. We are more familiar with the argument under the form of the comparative rates of
wages here and abroad, but it comes back to just what Ames so simply stated. The competition which the
protectionist employer has had to contend against here has never been the cheapness of foreign labor; it has
been the greater return which his men could get by putting the same labor on the soil. That is the only
meaning of the high wages in this country. What makes wages high? Where do they come from? Or why is
it that artisans are told that protection makes wages high? How are these things reconcilable? Or how is it18 / William Graham Sumner
that the foreign labor with which we are told that we cannot compete is especially that of England, where
wages are higher than anywhere else in Europe? Or why is it that high-priced labor can compete here in
agriculture and stand three or four thousand miles of transportation? Wages are high here because men of the
wages class can get all the fertile land they can till hy going to it; because the capital required is very small,
and because the returns are almost pure reward of labor. Hence they will not go into the wages class unless
the inducement is equal. It is the great form in which the new country holds out grand opportunities to the
man who has nothing but his manual labor to depend upon, and the protective system does, and always has
taken away from the farmer, laborer and artisan, the advantages which nature offered him in the new coun-
try.
To return to the tariff debate of 1789. The character of all tariff legislation in this country, as a grand
grab struggle between interests and sections, was illustrated then.
The South, except Georgia, wanted a high tariff duty on rum, for revenue; the Middle States, in the
interest of temperance, the Eastern States, for protection to their rum distilleries. Georgia opposed this tax
because she used a great deal of rum, and bought it in the West Indies with her lumber. The Southern and
Middle States wanted a tax also on molasses, but this the Eastern States vigorously opposed. Molasses was
the raw material of rum. It was bought with salt fish, lumber and staves sent to the West Indies. Bum was
itself an export to Africa. Both the Eastern States, in this case, and Georgia, in the preceding, felt and urged
the truth which the South urged in 1832, but which the manufacturers scouted, that the tariff on imports
would diminish the trade and lessen the exports; that is, cripple the “home industry.” Our present tariff is
unquestionably acting in the same way on all the great staple agricultural industries of the country which
export their product.
The South opposed the tax on iron and steel, as all agricultural interests must. The Pennsylvanians
replied that the manufacture was already established in their State, and that a slight duty would, “in a little
while,” lead to a great production.
The South wanted a protective tax on hemp, claiming that rice and indigo were unprofitable. Pennsyl-
vania opposed any tax on hemp as a raw material of cordage, but wanted a tax on that. New England opposed
the tax on cordage as a raw material of ships, but wanted protection on the latter. In the midst of this
wrangling effort to invent some way by law to enable people to get rich in the country, it is interesting to
notice that cotton was only incidentally alluded to. A tax of three cents a pound was put upon it, on the
chances that it might come to something. This well illustrates the amount of foresight that statesmen can
ever exercise in these matters. They passed over an article, destined by natural circumstances to become one
of the great staples of the country, while they were looking for something to encourage, and when they found
such an article, whose value lay in nature and fact, it was totally beyond their puny systems of artificial aid.
The South opposed any duty on spikes or nails. Goodhue replied for New England, that they were
already exported, and that a tax would soon produce enough for all North America. It was a “domestic
manufacture” in chimney corners. “Domestic manufactures” was a term then used for household manufac-
tures, which were regarded with great favor as a desirable thing.
For twenty-five years after this time protectionist journals gathered instances of farmers whose wives
or daughters spun and wove, and whose sons spent the evening in making nails at the chimney corner, and
such journals paraded these cases as glorious instances of industry. This went on long after machinery had so
cheapened these manufactures that an hour’s farm work would pay for more goods of this kind than people
could make by hand in a day, but the old people who clung to the method were pointed to as models, and the
young people who preferred printed calicoes to homespun and leisure to nail-making, were scolded for their
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erroneous point of view that we want work for the sake of work, and not for the sake of results; that industry
is a good thing, not because it produces more goods, but because it is work; that the ideal of life is not
abundance with leisure, but scarcity with toil Hence it seems wise to refuse the benefits of machinery owned
by foreigners in the first place, and before they know it, those who advocate protection to bring factories into
being are applauding those who refuse to profit by the machinery when established.
New England and Virginia, which latter then expected to become a ship-building State, favored navi-
gation acts as protection to shipping. The other States, as freight-payers and not ship owners, objected. A
discriminating tonnage duty was laid, and ten per cent, was reduced from duties on goods imported in
American ships. A special discriminating duty was laid on tea, because the tea trade could only be carried on
by “a drain of specie.” The wars in Europe and the increased trade of neutrals during the next twenty-five
years led to an immense increase of American shipping independent of protection, but it became an impor-
tant precedent, as I shall show, in the tariff debate of 1816.
The tariff of 1789 avowedly adopted the principle of protection. The preamble read as follows: “Whereas,
it is necessary for the support of the Government, for the discharge of the debts of the United States, and the
encouragement and protection of manufactures, that duties be laid, &c.” It was declared to be only tempo-
rary in order to give infant industries a start, and was limited to 1790. The duties levied under it were
equivalent to an ad valorem rate of 8¼ per cent. During the debate some were expressed that the duties might
be so high as to encourage smuggling. To this Mr. Madison replied that he “would not believe that the virtue
of our citizens was so weak as not to resist that temptation to smuggling which a seeming interest might
create. Their conduct under the British Government was no proof of a disposition to evade a just tax. At that
time they conceived themselves oppressed by a nation in whose councils they had no share, and on that
principle resistance was justified to their consciences. The case was now altered; all had a voice in every
regulation, and he did not despair of a great revolution in sentiment when it came to be understood that the
man who wounds the honor of his country by a baseness in defrauding the revenue, at the same time exposes
his neighbors to further impositions.”
This tariff, then, was the thin edge of the wedge. The duties were raised the next year so as to equal an
11 per cent ad valorem rate, and in 1792 they were raised to equal 13½ per cent. Between the tariff of 1789
and that of 1816, a period of twenty-six years, seventeen acts were passed affecting duties, generally and
steadily raising them.
The most important incident in this early tariff history was Hamilton’s report on the manufactures,
December 5, 1791. It came from a man who held and deserved high authority as a statesman, and it dealt
with the subject in a comprehensive manner. It has been the arsenal from which our popular school of
protectionists have borrowed ever since. Its political economy, however, is very erroneous, and defective in
many fundamental respects. It is erroneous as to wages, and it confuses credit, capital and money. It is
marked throughout by the errors of the old mercantile system, hinging all its views of foreign trade on the
import or export of specie to be occasioned. Thus. Hamilton says: “The West India Islands, the soils of
which are the most fertile, and the nation which in the greatest degree supplies the rest of the world with the
precious metals, exchange to a loss with almost every other country.”
He admits the force of the broad free trade arguments, but thinks that while other nations follow the
restrictive system, the United States must do so. He speaks of the hindrances met with in attempting to
export American products, which would seem to point to a general conviction of the mischief of the entire
restrictive system, and not to the conclusion that the United States ought to adopt the same policy. Though
led to advocate protection on this special plea, he goes on to try to give it a theoretical justification. We shall
have occasion to notice this again; but I beg you here to observe the difference. If the argument was made, as20 / William Graham Sumner
it often was for our first half century, that free trade was good, but that we must restrict because others did,
it would follow that we ought to abandon restriction as fast and as far as others did. If the argument was
based on principle and theory, it would be good any time, for all nations, and forever. The argument of
expediency was used, however, as in this report of Hamilton, to break the force of the common sense free
trade view, and the theoretical argument was smuggled in behind it. He distinguishes seven particulars in
which he thinks protection is theoretically advantageous. Of these, three, “the division of labor,” “affording
greater scope for the diversity of talents,” and “affording a more ample and various field for enterprise,” are
only subdivisions of the great doctrine of the “diversification of industry,” and may be noticed under that
head. The issue here between the free trader and the protectionist depends on radically different views of
human society. The question is whether industry diversifies itself as chances arise under the operation of
natural forces, so that man can neither hasten the process nor retard it without doing injury; or whether the
legislature must be always on the watch to discharge a heavy responsibility resting upon it, viz., to tell
society when and how to adjust itself into groups for industrial purposes. The industrial history of the Ameri-
can colonies offers the best proof in the world of the truth of the former view. There we see commnnities
growing from the simplest germ, isolated to a certain extent. We see that the development of society is as
regular and as natural as that of a plant, and there is no more need of human interference than there is to make
a bnd burst into a blossom at the proper moment. It is a development, moreover, which cannot be hastened
without injury. A new country cannot have the higher social developments until its population begins to
grow dense. It is so with us yet. We have not the literature or the science or the fine arts of the old countries,
but we have not their poverty and misery. We most take our advantages and disadvantages together.
Now the diversification of industry comes, so far as it is desirable or advantageous, of itself. We must
wait for it till it comes, and we must take it when it comes. The South will find its interest in cotton culture
as a great prevailing industry for a long time to come. The same is true of the wheat of the West. No
preaching can induce men to abandon the industry which is the most lucrative, and no law can make them do
it without injuring their interest. As for the scope for varied talents, persons go to the places which offer an
arena for their talents. They do not sit still and say: “Let us make an arena here.” The tendency of man, as
transportation is made easier and emigration freer, is to stop trying to coerce nature, and to put himself where
nature spontaneously aids him. As for the division of labor, it is just as great and just as advantageous, now
that transportation is easy, if the laborers are locally distributed as if they are industrially distributed. Look
at the distribution in our own country. The South raises raw materials, the West raises food, and the East
manufactures. As for the varied field of enterprise, the world opens that, and our enterprises seek the place of
advantage.
Hamilton next says that protection extends the use of machinery. He means that if there are manufac-
tures, there is more use for machinery than there is in agriculture. On this view yon do the business to use the
machinery, you do not use machinery to do the business.
Next he argues that protection furnishes additional employment to classes not formerly engaged in the
business. This is the argument that protection makes work. It is very true that protection makes work, but
that it makes more work without making more product. It increases the human exertion necessary to gain the
same amount of good.
He had in view domestic work auxiliary to adjacent manufactories. He thinks that the factories offer
employment to the wives and children of farmers, in work which they can do at home. He refers to the
children employed in factories in England, and he thinks that the farmer’s income might be enlarged by this
aid. Let us realize the facts. An American farmer could, by virtue of the advantages of the new country, if
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nity for the participation of all the family to a certain degree. Beyond that the farmer could give his wife
leisure for the culture and accomplishments of life. He could also support his children up to maturity, giving
them a long and complete education. How adopt the protective system and put up a fostered industry by the
side of his farm. I think it very likely that you would soon find his wife spending her time over work from the
factory, and his children curtailed of their time of education and sent to work in it. It would be found
necessary to take some such step to keep up the family income to the old figure. Work would be made for the
wife and children, and the amount of that work which they would be obliged to do would be no unfair
measure of the harm the restrictive system had inflicted on the farmer. The protective system simply lowers
the social attainments of farmers: and farmers’ wives, and lessens the degree of education to which farmers’
children can aspire.
The next object which Hamilton thought that a protective system could attain was the promotion of
immigration. The best examination of this claim is to look at the fact as to what immigration has taken place.
Of course protection cannot be credited with any other immigration than that which has taken place amongst
workmen in the protected industries. The total immigration for fifty-one years, from 1820 to 1870, was
7,800,000. Of these 4,800,000, or 61 per cent, had no occupation or stated none. They were mostly women
and children and laborers, supplying manual labor, which the new country demanded in large quantities. The
next largest number was of laborers so reported, 1,300,000. The next number was of farmers, 900,000,
bearing witness to the attractions of the natural advantages of the country simply. The next number was of
mechanics, not specified, 500,000. Of the others, the only ones possibly included in protected industries
were, miners, 92,181; weavers and spinners, 14,790 (of whom nearly half came between 1830 and 1840,
when, as is well known, large numbers of persons in these trades came from England on account of the
introduction of machinery, and sought other employment here); manufacturers, 4,520. Now, if we look at
the half million mechanics, we find that very few of them belong to industries which are protected. For the
sake of a closer examination, take a year of high protection and very large immigration, 1870. The total
immigration was 387,203. Of these, those classified as “skilled workmen,” numbered 31,964. Of these,
8,061 were “mechanics not stated,” leaving say 24,000. The largest numbers amongst these were, black-
smiths, 2,378; carpenters, 4,421; masons, 2,190; shoemakers, 1,557; tailors, 1,660 (none of whom certainly
profited by protection); miners, 4,763; weavers, 1,178 (who came into more or less protection). The others
who belonged to protected industries were, brewers, 362; cutlers, 5; distillers, 2; file-makers, 2; gunsmiths,
2; hatters, 58; hoemaker, 1; instrument maker, 1; iron workers, 3; jewelers, 409; nailmakers, 19; potters, 8;
printers, 180; puddlers, 2; rope-makers, 3; saddlers, 167; shipwrights, 9; soap-makers, 2; spinners, 7; tan-
ners, 102; wool-sorter, 1; operatives, 23; shepherds, 23. Out of a total of 387,203 immigrants, the number
who came to make articles which either could be or were protected was 6,960, or less than two per cent. It
appears that protection has not drawn immigrants, as a matter of fact.
Hamilton’s next point is that protection secures a more certain, and steady market for the products of
the soil. This is the notion of the “home market.” Hamilton urged it on the ground that foreign restrictions
hindered the exportation of an agricultural surplus. He thought it necessary for government to take the
matter in hand and provide or secure a home market. Obviously it is an advantage to any new country to
increase its inhabitants. If such increase took place anywhere there must follow an increased production.
Now, for the sake of brevity, I will state in general terms what happens, although every proposition
might be illustrated abundantly from our own colonial history. The industries which begin first in a new
country are those which the economists call “extractive industries.” They require little capital, and admit of
little division of labor. They are agriculture, lumbering, hunting or trapping, fishing and mining. Some
mechanics are needed in the building trades. In regard to these persons, one principle I have already stated22 / William Graham Sumner
was illustrated in the early history of Massachusetts. They would not work except at wages which would
equal the remuneration which they could get in the industries mentioned. The way the Puritans tried to deal
with the problem was to fix wages by law, but the men either took to agriculture, or went on to other
settlements where there was no such law. At first, every farmer is his own wheelwright and blacksmith and
carpenter. As the population increases there is a surplus of agricultural products. Some who hare greater skill
or taste for the mechanical arts work in those occupations for others until the division of labor becomes
established gradually and naturally. Some products are exported, being raw materials of great demand.
Manufactured goods, cloth, tools, books, paper, and all the comforts and conveniences of the old life, of the
colonists are imported in exchange. Some become merchants to carry on this exchange, and build a town at
the seaport. At first, clergymen and schoolmasters may be the only professional men, and they act as lawyers
and doctors. All participate in legislation; merchants do all the banking. As the population increases and the
country fills up the extractive industries become less lucrative. The sources for some of them become ex-
hausted, the supplies of others become superabundant. Farming itself undergoes subdivisions and refine-
ments. Orchards are planted for fruit, and gardens for vegetables. Stock raising becomes profitable, and
dairy farming is extended. Simultaneously with this, without any dividing line, or any exertion whatever, the
simple mechanic arts which existed at the outset grow into independent manufactures, according to the
circumstances of the case. It depends on the distance of the colony, the facility of transportation, the market
for its surplus abroad, the amount of land open, how soon or how rapidly this social organization will be
developed. If foreign nations all had severe restrictions upon the entrance of the goods this country wanted
to export, they would put just so much premium on the early development of manufactures there. The whole
tendency of a surplus supply of food would be to force some of the producers of it to seek some other
employment, in which they would produce other things to exchange with their neighbors for food. Every
refusal of a foreign country to take the only things the new country could offer in exchange for its goods
would throw the inhabitants back on their neighbors to supply the want by such exchange. Every such act
would, moreover, diminish the value of the surplus, that is, would increase the amount which the farmer
could afford to give his neighbor for making his cloth and iron for him. The “home market” would thus
“provide” itself, if it was wanted, and the want itself would be the result of foreign errors, injuring in just so
far the community in question. If one of their own statesmen took it into his head that it was his business to
provide a home market, he could only do it by adopting the restrictive system, and still further depressing the
profits of agriculture, and thus accellerating the mischievous process already at work.
The repeal of the corn laws in England was accordingly a great blow to American manufactures,
because it allowed American agriculture to come to a part of its natural rights, and we have been trying, ever
since 18C1, to neutralize this by heavier pressure of taxation. That same repeal, however, took away all
Hamilton’s argument, and the general argument has since been altered. We have been told lately that protec-
tion is to bring the manufacturer and the farmer near together; to give the farmer a market near his own door,
and in various ways the export of agricultural produce has been represented as an evil. But when we talk of
“bringing” the manufacturer and farmer together, it may fairly be asked: Who is to “bring?” This is language
for an Assyrian king, deporting inhabitants from one part of a country to another. If the manufacturer finds
the conditions of successful industry lead him to a certain spot, well and good. That spot will enjoy the
benefit of its peculiar advantages. But if it has no such advantages, and we plant a factory there, shall we
thereby give them to it? Shall we ever get back the expended force? Shall we not rather suffer loss so long as
the artificial creation stands where it ought not to be? Will not that loss come out of the legitimate, sound and
healthy industries? The error is in thinking that we ever can get out of an artificial creation any more than we
put into it; it is only when we get nature to work with us and for us, that we can get anything gratuitously. TheLectures on the History of Protection in the United States / 23
American farmer has long ago found that there cannot te two prices in the same market; that he does not get
any different price for his wheat if consumed next door from that which he gets if it is consumed in Man-
chester. He rarely knows where it is consumed and never cares.
The whole idea of advantage in bringing farmer and manufacturer together is a delusion. It is much
more important to bring the various manufacturers together, because they form groups which assist and
sustain each other, and it is important to bring them to the country or place where the conditions of success
exist. This place will not be where the profits of capital and the wages of labor in either agriculture or
commerce are exceptionally high. Hence to carry a factory by force into an agricultural district will be to
ruin the factory and not help the farmer. Where the profits of one industry far exceed those of all others, we
have that one only. Where the profits of several are equal, we have them all. The advantages and disadvan-
tages of either state of things are about equal.
Hamilton next proceeds to consider the objection to manufactures, that they are impossible here on
account of the dearness of labor and the scarcity of capital. He reduces both these objections to a minimum,
but shows thereby that protection was not necessary, and proves finally that manufactures were possible by
enumerating many which were already thriving. In fact the country became very prosperous in 1789 and
1790 so soon as civil order was secured.
Further on again he urges an argument which is especially interesting because at a later time it became
very popular: that protection lowers prices through the home competition. One is impelled to ask why, then,
those interested desire it. Who would urge Government interference to lower the price of his goods? If the
Government should so act, who would not cry out to be “let alone”? Nevertheless, the assertion is not
without truth, only it is not all the truth. The first effect of a tariff is to draw many persons into the protected
industries who believe that the tariff gives them full margin, and that special knowledge, or business care, or
sagacity in choice of situation are not necessary. Factories are built extravagantly, or in bad situations. There
follows large production, a glut, a fall in prices, perhaps even below foreign prices. Then come failures of
those who have been most reckless. Then the remaining strong firms continue and adopt rules to “limit
production,” the necessary manipulation of any monopoly. Prices rise again on a limited supply, and the
operation is repeated unless the combination is really strong enough to keep others out. These fluctuations
are the real character of a tariff system, not either high prices or low prices, and they are one great reason
why protection does not protect.
Hamilton next considers the means of protection, of which he enumerates eleven. These are import
duties, prohibition on imports, prohibitions on exports, bounties, premiums, drawbacks, patents, inspection
laws, facilitation of remittances, and improvements in transportation.
It is worth while to notice and pay tribute to the good faith of this statesman, who, however mistaken,
believed that he was working for his country’s good. He was not an advocate of a special interest, and he, at
any rate, treated his subject philosophically. You have here the whole system of interference logically car-
ried out. Bounties, patents, premiums, inspection laws, Government banking, and subsidies to transporta-
tion— all belong to one consistent theory, and yon are dealing with a man who, at any rate, could seize a
principle and either pursue it as true or abandon it as false. The issue comes squarely before yon. Either it is
the business of Government to do all these things or none. You either want a paternal Government or you
want a Government which is merely a reserved force in behalf of peace, justice and security, and which is at
its best when it has the least occasion to act. Hamilton’s scheme has been very unequally carried out. Export
duties are forbidden in the Constitution. Bounties on exports we have never directly employed. Drawbacks
are substantially the same thing, although they are professedly intended to counterbalance duties on raw
materials. Direct bounties and premiums we have not used, because the loss would be too distinctly seen.24 / William Graham Sumner
For that reason, however, they would be the best arrangement of all if we were to go into the system at all. By
the census of 1870, the laborers engaged in manufacturing pig-iron numbered altogether 27,554, and their
wages amounted to $12,400,000. The capital employed is returned at $56,100,000. We are pointed to this as
a great industry—a grand thing to have. The duty was, when the census was taken, $9 per ton, and the market
price of American over imported iron showed that this sum was directly added to the cost of ad we used. The
product of the home manufacture was 2,000,000 tons, on which the tariff cost us $18,000,000, of which the
public treasury got not one cent. Seven per cent on the capital in pig-iron manufacture would be $3,900,000,
which, with the wages paid to laborers in that trade, would make $16,000,000. If, therefore, we had made a
bargain with the pig-iron manufacturers to let their capital decay, paying them seven per cent on it, and with
the people employed to stay idle while we paid them their full wages, provided that we might have our iron
free, we should have made $2,000,000 per annum, to say nothing of the fact that, at the lower price, we night
have afforded a much larger consumption of iron. We should, moreover, have had 509 steam engines to
apply to other work. We should have saved $18,000,000 worth of coal, charcoal and coke for other uses, and
we should have left 4,000,000 tons of iron ore in the ground for those who come after us to use when they can
do it profitably. All this is on the protectionist hypothesis that this industry would not have existed bnt for the
tariff, a hypothesis which I by no means admit Now, if we bad had a bounty on iron, instead of a tariff, these
facts would be far more generally known than they are. Inspection laws have been gradually laid aside,
because they interfere with trade. They are ostensibly in the public interest, and far less objectionable than
the other means mentioned; but here the cry has been raised to be “let alone.” Patents we have extended
more and more, until any plea which may be made for them is overwhelmed under their abuse. The other
devices, Government banking and subsidies, we are still struggling with.
I have spent so much time and attention on this paper of Hamilton, because it has been historically of
very great importance. It is the best statement of the protectionist argument ever made, and demands this
much attention in any general discussion of the question. In the ten years following its preparation, during
which Hamilton, either directly or indirectly, controlled the financial policy of the Government, it was found
necessary to raise greater and greater revenue. Hamilton had, in presenting hi;: plan, been very careful to
define the limits within which he thought that the means he proposed might be safely and wisely employed.
In his further financial steps he by no means extended and advanced the import duties with a view either to
revenue or protection. He introduced internal and direct taxes for the avowed purpose of establishing a well
balanced system of taxation. These taxes were all repealed on Jefferson’s accession in 1802. Hamilton also
prepared the system for assessing and collecting internal taxes which was revived in the second war with
England, and again during the late war. Its reintroduction on each of these occasions took time, involved
great delay and inconvenience, and caused expense which would have gone far to pay for keeping it up
during the interval.Lecture IV: The Establishment of Protection in this
Country.
In my last lecture I sketched the origin of the protective system, in this country. I now proceed to describe its
growth and establishment. This was brought about by incidents connected with the Napoleonic wars. The
wars of the French revolution, and those which followed, produced great effects upon the trade of the civi-
lized world. The United States, as the chief neutral carrier, saw its shipping multiplied and its mercantile
interests enriched. The belligerents, in their struggles to injure each other, endeavored to put a stop to this
neutral traffic, and inflicted great injury on the neutral who was carrying it on. Nevertheless, the profits were
so great that the Americans continued it, in spite of losses. When war broke out again in 1803, the indigna-
tion here at the collisions which took place was so great, that measures of resistance and retaliation were
sought. The federalists wanted to put the country in a state of defence and build a navy to protect commerce.
They represented the Northeastern States and the shipping interests. The administration, however, with the
great majority from the Middle and Southern States, demanded a navy, sought to reduce expenditures, and
turned its attention to measures of coercion by commercial war. These measures had been tried with sad
results during the revolution. Mr. Madison had urged discriminating duties in the first tariff as a means of
forcing foreign nations to grant reciprocity, and he had urged coercive and retaliatory measures of that hand
during Washington’s administration when hostilities in Europe first broke out. It is astonishing what faith
was entertained in such measures. You see it still strong in the South when the civil war broke out, when it
was believed that withholding cotton would force European nations to intervene.
In 1805 an act was passed for prohibiting the importation of English manufactures in order to force
England to give up impressment, and in order to support Pinkney and Munroe in their efforts to make a
treaty. In 1806 England blockaded the northern coast of Europe from Brest to the Elbe. Napoleon retaliated
by the Berlin Decree. In the next year England replied by the orders in council; Napoleon rejoined by the
Milan Decree, and England returned once more by more stringent prohibitions. The tenor of these decrees
on the one side and on the other was to prohibit neutrals from trading with the enemy, or to put such trade
under heavy restraints. Napoleon was trying to shut the continent against English manufactures, and Eng-
land was trying to keep out of the continent provisions and colonial supplies. Between the two, neutral
commerce suffered the greatest loss and vexation. The American shipowners complained and called on their
government for protection. The measure adopted was the embargo of 1807, by which the shipowners were
protected against foreign aggressors by being shut up at home. They had before incurred heavy risks, now
their own government imposed certain ruin. It was necessary to pass one act after another, making the
embargo more stringent and tyrannical in order to check evasions of it. It was repealed in a little over a year,26 / William Graham Sumner
but non-intercourse and non-importation acts were substituted for it until war grew out of it in 1812.
We are concerned with this commercial war here, not on account of its folly or imbecility, although it
well represents the folly of all restriction, but on account of its connection with the strand of history which
we are following. Embargo, non-intercourse, and war, lasting from 1807 to 1815, created an entirely artifi-
cial state of things here, or, perhaps I should say, the United States was drawn into the distortion and perver-
sion of industry and commerce which the great wars were producing in Europe. Manufactories of various
kinds sprang up here to supply the wants of the people when cut off from the usual sources of supply by
foreign exchange. They produced articles of inferior quality or design, generally speaking, but people had to
be satisfied with them. In many cases also the products were dearer than those normally obtainable abroad.
They were sustained by the artificial difficulties in foreign exchange, and by the diminished profits of other
industries which would have been more profitable here. In 1810, Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, made
a report in which he stated that manufactures of wood and leather, amongst other things, were exported
beyond the imports, that the following industries were “firmly established,” iron and manufactures of iron,
manufactures of cotton, wool and flax, paper, printing types, books, several manufactures of hemp, and a
few others. In that year (1810) some effort was made to get more protection through duties, but nothing
came of it. The same effort played some share in bringing about the war, which was a product of intrigue,
and as needless as it was fruitless. One of the first war measures was to double all duties and prohibit the
import of English products. During the war the prices of manufactured articles were very high. Manufactur-
ers made great profits and factories were built in large numbers. In 1814 all the banks suspended specie
payments, and then followed a reckless paper money period which has never been equalled since. Prices
rose higher than ever, and here we have again an illustration of the observation previously made that our
currency and tariff errors have been intertwined throughout our history.
Observe now the outcome of all this for the matter of our investigation. Embargo and war had created
a false and artificial state of things in which much capital had been invested in manufactures, and “industry”
had been “encouraged.” “Under the false light in which they were viewed, embargo and war, therefore,
seemed to be beneficial forces, The return of peace, if it reopened trade and let things return to their normal
condition, would be a calamity. It was necessary to secure a continuance of the circumstances which had
brought these industries into existence, in order to secure them from destruction. Such continuance could not
be brought about without perpetuating for the great body of consumers the scarcity, loss and distress of war,
so far as war affected their power to procure and enjoy industrial products. This then is exactly what the
tariff, which was adopted in 1816, did do. It saved a part of the capital involved in manufactures, although
most of it was swept away in the financial crisis which ensued in 1819, on the collapse of the paper system,
but it burdened the nation with the same trammels which embargo and war had laid upon it.
The act of May 3d, 1815, repealed all discriminating duties and tonnage taxes in favor of any nation
which should take similar action with regard to American vessels and cargoes. Here we have a fact of
interest to the general history which we are pursuing. This was what was known as the “American system,”
at this time. We saw how, in the treaty with France in 1778, the Americans set out to gain general reciproc-
ity. That came to be called the “American system,” viz., general reciprocity instead of the old commercial
treaties. Now the plan of laying countervailing duties to enforce reciprocity came to be called the “American
system,” and was so called until 1824, when, by a still farther perversion, that name was applied to the
system of protective duties. Daniel Webster, at that time, well said of it: “This favorite American policy is
what America has never tried; and this odious foreign policy is what, as we are told, foreign states have
never pursued.”
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was approved April 27th, 1816. The tariff was not at this time, or for sixteen years after, a political question,
but it is noteworthy that tariffs were passed in every presidential year until 1832, except in 1820. All parties
agreed, however reluctantly, in passing the increased duties, for fear of alienating the votes of the protected
interests. In 1820 a tariff was proposed, but failed, because Mr. Monroe was to be re-elected without a
contest. As yet, however, in 1816, the question was neither political nor sectional New England generally
opposed the tariff, but not universally. The South acceded to it for the sake of cotton. This article was then
heavily taxed abroad, and some very cheap manufactures of it from China and India were largely imported.
It was believed that the development of cotton manufactures here was the best way to make cotton
culture lucrative. Lowndes, of South Carolina, reported the bill, and Calhoun made a speech in favor of it It
was based on a report by Dallas, Secretary of the Treasury, in which he divided the articles subject to duty
into three classes: (1) those of which the home supply was adequate to the demand; (2) those of which the
supply was partial; (3) those of which the supply was small or nothing. He proposed graduated duties on
these three classes, the highest duty falling on the first class. You observe at once the incongruity. On the
plan of fostering infant industries, duties would evidently be highest on articles producible but not produced,
or only slightly produced; but here we find the market closed when the supply is adequate, and only a
revenue tax laid on those articles which were least produced, and a medium tax on those which were in the
heat of the struggle. It is the best possible test of a theory to see whether it admits of two contradictory
applications in practice, for between theory and practice there can be no inconsistency. If any appears, it is
proof positive that either the theory or the practice needs revision and correction. To say that a thing is true
in theory but bad in practice is a radical absurdity. Theory is the attempt of man to learn general principles
for guidance in his practical tasks. Practice is the test of theory, and shows that the general principles have
been either correctly or incorrectly apprehended. When, therefore, a theory admits of two opposite applica-
tions in practice, one of which fits it as well as the other, it proves conclusively that the theory embraces a
contradiction, and we see why protection of infant industries never leads to their independence and to free
trade. The advocates of protection use the first form of the theory to secure its adoption and the second to
secure its perpetuation.
Calhoun’s chief argument for protection was the need of the proposed manufactures in case of war.
This argument had considerable force at the end of a war in which foreign supplies had been cut off, but, on
the other hand, the exactions of the manufacturers during the war led many to resent any attempt now to
favor them.
The argument for protection to provide against the contingency of war has great popular weight. The
policy and history of the United States since 1816, however, afford a striking commentary on it. We have
always kept our army down a little below the point of efficiency. We have grudged the education of a few
officers. We have reduced our navy so low that we hardly do our share in the police of the ocean. We pay
little heed to our fortifications. Yet we voluntarily expose ourselves to a loss far greater than the cost of any
armament, out of obedience to this notion of providing for a possible war by industrial restraints. Our popu-
lar orators formerly made much capital by comparing our expenditures for army, navy and fortifications,
with those of the old countries; but they said nothing of this industrial loss incurred to the same end.
Furthermore, is it not a satire on this notion to remember that the only wars in which we have been
engaged since 1816 have been that with Mexico and the civil war, in neither of which our cherished indus-
trial independence was of any use to us?
I am not arguing for expenditures on armies and navies. Far from it. We are happy in not needing them.
Any one who has to come three thousand miles to fight us will think well of it first. I only point out the
grotesque contrast between our preparations for war of the one kind and of the other.28 / William Graham Sumner
In fact, however, the independence which we seek must be sought in another direction. Independent
men are those who have wealth, not those whose houses are stored for a siege. Independent nations are those
which are wealthy, because they can command what they want when they want it. Those will be wealthiest
which give industry its freest course in time of peace.
The case of the South during the late war is a most striking proof of the fallacy of the “independence”
doctrine. The South had less of this artificial independence than any country in the world. It was blockaded
and inclosed by an immensely superior force, and what happened? First, people found that when they had
put their last stake on war, they could do without thousands of things which had seemed essential; second,
they found substitutes and makeshifts to take the place of real essentials; third, they found that, so long as
they had commodities to exchange which the rest of the world wanted, no power could prevent the exchange
from going on. It does not become those who needed four years to subdue the South to argue that it was weak
for lack of industrial independence. Indeed, the argument is incomplete in two or three important points.
Suppose that the South had not been weakened by slavery; suppose that it had been an independent nation
before and had enjoyed free trade, so that its people had possessed all the wealth they might have accumu-
lated; suppose that its enemy had been obliged to seek it over the ocean, and by sea attack only; on such a
hypothesis who can believe that the South would have suffered because it had not “enjoyed protection,” and
who can urge us, on the chances of ever finding ourselves in the position of the South, to go on creating an
artificial independence? Our independence lies in union, good government, and free industry.
The tariff of 1816 was not carried against the instincts of the American people towards freedom with-
out strong opposition. The great majority adhered to the old Jeffersonian doctrines and policy. They wanted
to get rid of the army and navy, to reduce taxes and expenditures, to reduce the number of office-holders, and
to “let things alone.” The prevailing argument was the interest of the existing investments, which, of coarse,
no one desired to destroy. It soon appeared, however, that the barrier of taxation was no equivalent for
embargo and war.
The return of peace in Europe allowed industry and finance to return to the operations of natural laws
and to escape from the constraints of twenty-five years of war. The shock was terrible, and it took ten years
for its effects to subside. In 1816, the English exported immense quantities of manufactured goods to the
Continent and to the United States. The results of these transactions were disastrous. Our paper money here
also exercised its influence to encourage overtrading and overimportation. In 1817, the manufacturers were
in distress. Cries were heard against the inundations of foreign goods, against the drain of specie and against
the balance of trade. Evidently we cannot understand these things without taking into account the move-
ments which were going on in the other industrial nations, but the popular opinion here was that the English
had set out, by a sacrifice of some millions worth of goods, to destroy American manufactures. This belief
had deep root and perhaps has only lately died out, since we have ceased to hear cries of “British gold”
whenever any one spoke of free trade. The notion I have referred to received strong re-enforcement from a
remark of Brougham’s which you may find quoted in the first popular protectionist work you choose to take
up, in which he recommended his countrymen to reconquer the, American market. If he meant to propose to
them to sacrifice their capital in giving several millions’ worth of goods to the Americans in order to destroy
factories which would spring up again the moment they tried to reimburse themselves, they would have been
the first to laugh at him.
An eager effort, however, in favor of protection was now commenced, and it was kept up for fifteen
years. It had an organ in Niles’ Register, the editor of which was a fanatical protectionist. He filled his paper,
week after week, with essays, items, statistics, and arguments in favor of “home industry.” No such effort
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tendency of the American people to freedom, and their early bias that way, was perverted, only by observing
the zeal and industry with which protectionism was inculcated.
The tariff of 1816 had provided for a gradual decline of the tax on cotton and woolen goods, and
Congress had refused to include, as was desired, a prohibition of nankeens, but the time at which the reduc-
tion on woolens and cottons was to take place was deferred until 1826, by an Act of April, 20, 1818, and the
duty on bar iron was raised from $9 to $15 per ton.
The tariff of 1816 had also adopted the principle of the minimum on cotton cloth, and cotton yarn, none
of the former being rated at less than 25 cents per square yard, whatever its cost at the place of exportation.
This, of course, cut off the American people from any advantage by the great factory system of England, or
from the introduction of machinery in England, so far as these improvements tended to cheapen cotton cloth.
It ought to be added that the incorrect valuation of the pound sterling, the inaccuracy of the weights and
measures used at this time, and the long credit given by the government for duties, to some extent neutral-
ized the duties.
In 1820, Mr. Baldwin, of Pittsburgh, introduced three bills, one for increased duties, one for taxes on
auction sales, and one for cash payment of duties, which all failed to pass. In 1822 and 1823, other bills were
introduced for increasing duties, which failed to pass. It was not until the great presidential struggle of 1824
that another tariff crowned the seven years’ struggle. Before taking that up I desire to present to you some of
the chief doctrines which were believed and taught at this time, as we learn them from the congressional
debates and Miles’ Register.
It was argued that wages were not higher here than in England when properly measured. This was in
answer to the free trade argument as then put, that it was useless to try to develop manufactures here because
of this disadvantage. Of course, if it is true that wages are higher here, that would be the true inference.
It was also agreed, on behalf of protection, that protection and revenue were antagonistic to each other,
and that the government ought to be supported by “direct” taxation, while duties on imports should be
reserved entirely for purposes of protection. Niles published long articles in which he urged this view of the
subject, and be brought forward many and strong considerations in favor of what he called direct taxation.
He showed what the tariff really cost each consumer, he opposed a revenue from import duties as uncertain,
and all this in favor of prohibitory duties for the purpose of protection.
Another feature of the controversy was that the shipping interest was blamed in no measured terms for
opposing protection to manufactures. The growth of shipping was pointed out and traced back to the dis-
criminating and tonnage duties of 1789, and the shipping interest was charged with selfishness in resisting
the application of the same means to other industries. In this connection we meet with the best instance of the
fallacy which inheres in the word “protection” itself. In making up the account against the shipping interest
for the protection which had been accorded to it, the war undertaken for its defence, but against its will, was
charged to it, and also the entire expense of the navy. The navy “protected” the merchant ships from unlaw-
ful attacks or interference, that is, it gave them the security which it is the business of government to provide,
and which is analogous to the office of courts and police on land, bnt this protection was made a basis of
argument, that the government ought to interfere likewise to “protect” producers against industrial compe-
tition.
A similar charge of selfishness was brought against the cotton manfacturers of New England, who,
after 1820, opposed any further protection. Their industry was firmly established and very remunerative,
and they found that the effect of protection was simply to disturb their business by tempting great numbers
into it, and by exposing it to great fluctuations. It was argued against them that the system ought to be
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been shown, it reduces the system to an absurdity. After taxing the community to foster one industry, it is
proposed to tax that one, with others, to foster a second, then all the preceding to encourage a third. It follows
that the first and second lose their advantage, and that the result is a series of weak fosterlings supported by
weakened legitimate industries.
The same criticism applies to any system of “incidental protection.” The claim is put in to widen the
system and do “justice” by favoring all, which is impossible. The only real justice is to favor none.
The great argument of this period, however, was “hard times.” There was a commercial crisis in 1819,
which has not, perhaps, been equalled since. The complaints were kept up for five years, although the only
ground for them, if any, was the comparison with the flush times of speculation and paper money, and they
were just such times of distress as the whole commercial world was enduring. The complaints ceased when
the tariff of 1824 was passed.
Those who argued most strenuously on this ground, found themselves putting propositions together
which made a strange combination when compared. Thus: (1.) The United States is the richest country in the
world in point of natural resources, and has only a sparse population. (2.) This favored country is in great
distress. (3.) What it needs is more taxation to enable its people to get a living in it.
We not unfrequently find arguments used during this period which show that the speakers or writers
believed that a girl in a Manchester factory, who, with a loom, could produce as much cloth as several men
could make by hand in the same time, was therefore able to exchange her product for the product of the labor
of that number of American farmers. Of course all the notions about the balance of trade, and draining
specie, and making money scarce are met with continually.
The duties collected under the tariff of 1816, during the last three years of its operation, were equal to
a rate of 30 per cent on dutiable imports. Yon see that there had been great progress since Hamilton’s day.
I come now to the tariff of 1824. That act would not have been passed if it had not been for the political
contest which was impending. Here we meet with the new factor of political intrigue, and also with those
phenomena which arise from the extension and complexity of the system. This bill was dexterously com-
bined to embrace strength enough to carry it. We also now find the South opposed to protection; as indeed
she had been since 1820. The arguments employed were not new, but the issue was clearer and the debate
was far better sustained from the free trade side. We have an argument by Mr. Webster, in which several of
the issues which continually arise in this controversy are handled in a masterly manner. He argued them on
a plane entirely above the wretched patch-work of which the discussion otherwise consisted. I have already
quoted his crushing criticism of the notion of protection as an “American system,” under the application of
that title which now became current. He showed the advance of opinion on this matter abroad, and showed
that we were taking on our young shoulders a load which the older nations would be glad to throw off, if they
were not clogged by so many vested interests. He also showed that the distress complained of, so far as it had
existed in the last few years, had been due to currency troubles here and abroad, and gave a correct explana-
tion, which few seemed able to understand, of the phenomena of the exchanges here in 1820 and 1821. In
regard to the comparative rates of wages, he said. The chairman of the committee “says it would cost the
nation nothing, as a nation, to make our ore into iron. Now, I think it would cost us precisely that which we
can worst afford; that is, great labor. * * * We have been asked * * in a tone of some pathos, whether we will
allow to the serfs of Russia and Sweden the benefit of making our iron for us. Let me inform the gentleman
that those same serfs do not earn more than seven cents a day, and that they work in these mines, for that
compensation, because they are serfs. And, let me ask the gentleman further, whether we have any labor in
this country that cannot be better employed than in a business which does not yield the laborer more than
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own iron is, that they are far 6etter employed. It is an unproductive business, and they are not poor enough to
be obliged to follow it. If we had more of poverty, more of misery and something of servitude; if we had an
ignorant, idle, starving population, we might set up for iron makers against the world. * * * The freight of
iron has been afforded from Sweden to the United States as low as eight dollars per ton. This is not more than
the price of fifty miles’ land carriage. Stockholm, therefore, for the purpose of this argument, may be consid-
ered as within fifty miles of Philadelphia. Now, it is at once a strong and just view of this case, to consider
that there are, within fifty miles of our market, vast multitudes of persons who are willing to labor in the
production of this article for us at the rate of seven cents per day, while we have no labor which will not
command, upon the average, at least five or six times that amount The question is then, shall we buy this
article of these manufacturers and suffer our own labor to earn its greater reward, or shall we employ our
own labor in a similar manufacture, and make up to it, by a tax on consumers, the loss which it must
necessarily sustain.”
Unfortunately, Mr. Webster was bound by local interests to sustain the protection to shipping, and this
was fatal to his opposition. Massachusetts wanted protection on ships, but not on hemp or iron or molasses.
A small Massachusetts interest joined with Rhode Island and Connecticut in favor of an increased tax on
woolens, but not on wool. The tariff of 1816, it was said, had not sufficiently protected woolens, and had
made the tax, such as it was, diminish at intervals. The English bounty on exported woolens was a damage
which, it was claimed, ought to be counteracted. Observe the antagonism here established : England, pursu-
ing the old restrictive system by these bounties, made a present to foreign nations at the expense of her own
taxpayers. The foreign nations regarded this gift as an injury, and set up barriers against its acceptance, at the
expense of their taxpayers. Could anything more conclusively condemn the whole system?
Then look at the internal conflict of interest. Kentucky wanted a tax on hemp to encourage her produc-
tion, although her dew-rotted hemp was so inferior to the Russian water-rotted hemp that it never competed.
She also wanted a tax on molasses to make rum dear in the interest of whiskey. Lousiana wanted a tax on
molasses for protection to her sugar planters. The Middle States and Ohio wanted protection on raw wool;
and Pennsylvania, of course, wanted protection on iron. In the conflict of interests New England was de-
feated, having less political power, and hemp, whiskey, iron, and raw wool, uniting the Middle and Western
States, carried the day. The minimum on cottons was raised to 30 cts. A minimum for woolens was estab-
lished at 33 1/3 cts., and the duty was put at 30 per cent, to be advanced to 33 1/3 per cent in a year. Raw wool,
costing less than 10 cts. per lb., was to pay 15 per cent. Other wool was to pay 20 per cent for a year, 25 per
cent the second year, and 30 per cent, afterwards. Bar iron was raised to $18 per ton if forged, and stood at
$30 if rolled. This was to off-set the cheapness of the new process chiefly used in England.
This tariff passed the House by 107 to 102. New England gave 15 votes for it, and 23 against it. The
Southern and Southwestern States gave two votes for it The duties collected under it were, on an average
equal to a rate of 37 per cent.
One expects now, in reading the contemporaneous records, to be rid of the subject for a time. The
reader naturally says: “The tariff has been raised; the protection has been granted. The question is disposed
of.” Nothing of this kind, however, took place. The high-tariff interest was by no means satisfied with the
result, especially as regarded woolens. The agitation recommenced the next year, with a reiteration of the
old arguments, condemnation of “our present ruinous system,” and demand for protection, as if there had
been no concessions in that direction. This calls our attention to certain features inherent in the protective
system, and shows us how erroneous in practice, as well as in theory, is the notion that we can proceed
through protection to free trade. Protection nourishes dependence, not independence. It is a system in which
all the parts hang together, and protection for some cannot be united with freedom for others. If one industry32 / William Graham Sumner
should be set out in free competition, while the rest were protected, it would be found that they are interde-
pendent; that machinery, raw materials and labor supplies would be so dear that the exposed industry Would
have no Mr chance in competition with foreigners. Hence one long protected industry, if it became inde-
pendent by natural causes, could not be left free unless the whole system were abandoned. But then the cry
goes up from those nurslings of recent beginning, that they are not yet ready. If you defer the introduction of
freedom for ten years longer on their account, a new company of infants is meantime brought into being, and
the plea for farther delay comes from them. Thus yon go on forever, and the theory is reduced to an absurd-
ity.
During the period from 1824 to 1828 the political factor in the tariff controversy rose to chief impor-
tance. The administration of J. Q. Adams was exposed to the most vigorous and relentless opposition from
the party which had formed around Andrew Jackson. After the Democratic convention of Harrisburg in 1824
it was certain that Pennsylvania was enthusiastic for Jackson. The rural population of that State cared more
for Jackson than for tariff. This was a fact which the politicians had simply to accept as a fact The composi-
tion of the Jackson party, therefore, coincided to a certain extent with the coalition which had passed the
tariff of 1824. New England as the Adams section was, both politically and on the tariff, still more in a
position to be neglected than it was in 1847. The South found its political combinations and its tariff interests
inconsistent.
England still furnished a convenient and popular object of attack. She now showed her perfidy and
desire to ruin American manufactures by reducing her own duties on raw wool to one penny per lb. This
enabled her manufacturers to manufacture so cheaply as to pay our import duties and yet compete with
success. According to the theory which we are studying, this was a serious reason for “protecting” ourselves
against the good this might have brought to us. The woolen manufacturers of Boston accordingly sent a
petition to Congress in 1826 asking for more protection. Jan. 10th, 1827, a bill was introduced for raising the
duties on wool and woolens. It was tabled in the Senate by the casting rote of Calhoun. It was in the New
England interest, and, as Niles said, politics were in the way.
In July, 1827, a national convention met at Harrisburg, called by the Pennsylvania Society for the
Promotion of Manufactures and Mechanic Acts to consider measures for promoting manufactures. It was
the most energetic attempt ever made to organize and give symmetry to the protectionist movement. It
adopted resolutions in favor of more protection for iron, steel, glass, wool, woolens and hemp. It proposed a
duty of 20 cents a pound on wool costing 8 cents or more, to advance 2½ cents per annum until it should be
50 cents. It adopted four minima for woolens, 50 cents, $2.50, $4.00, $6.00. The duty was to be 40 per cent
for a year, 45 per cent the next year, and 50 per cent afterwards.
The committee on manufactures at the next session of Congress recommended that evidence should be
taken as to the state of manufactures. This was a new departure, for hitherto all tariff legislation had been
made blindly and ignorantly. The Northern protectionists opposed the proposition; the South favored and
carried it. The evidence all went to show deplorable distress in all manufacturing industry, although the
country generally was enjoying great prosperity. The argument necessarily was tangled and contradictory. It
was urged, and really was the greatest popular argument, that the country owed its prosperity to the tariff, but
here were the manufacturers claiming to be in distress. The truth was that the country possessed such means
of producing wealth that the tariff could not crush them. Then again the distress was needed as an argument
for more protection, but what light did it throw back on the previous attempts in that direction?
Many of the peculiar doctrines I have mentioned as advocated at an earlier period were now heard no
longer, but a new one was brought forward and repeated again and again, viz., that protection, by domestic
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The new tariff bill was introduced in February, 1828. It was based upon the recommendations of the
Harrisburg convention. Its central feature was wool and woolens. Hemp, iron and molasses figured as be-
fore. It came forward, therefore, as a New England or Adams measure, and the Jackson coalition opposed it,
but under the necessity of satisfying the Middle and Western States. The feeling in the South was already
very bitter about the tariff legislation, and this new effort to push on the system, reckless of Southern pro-
tests, still further embittered the South. The West also took the position that they had as yet had nothing of
this good, which it was assumed that the Government had to distribute, and they demanded that, if the
system was to go on, they should have their share. Mr. Webster took the position for Massachusetts, that she
had been forced into manufactures by the policy adopted in 1824, in spite of her protests, and she now
protested that the investments into which she had been drawn should not be sacrificed.
You look in vain through the discussion of this bill for any broad principles. Much was said indeed
about a national policy, but it all referred to this system which, at the first approach to actual discussion,
resolved itself into political intrigue, a strife of sections, and a struggle between “interests.” Much was said
about broad principles, but all referred to the notion that by robbing all for the benefit of the few it was
possible in some way, which never was explained, to gain great benefit to all. The South adopted the policy
of trying to make the bill as bad as possible. They proposed and advocated absurd and extravagant exaggera-
tions, in the hope, apparently, that they could thus make apparent to the protectionists the enormity of their
propositions and the absurdity of their demands. This policy did not work. The belief in the great protection-
ist dogmas had now become strong. Political exigencies were great, and the Northern protectionists either
rejected the exaggerated propositions, or accepted them in good faith. This tariff came to be known as the
“tariff of abominations,” but its worst abominations were forced into it by the perverse policy of the South-
ern men. What it concerns us to observe is, the evil effects of mixing up politics and president-making with
fiscal legislation, and the exaggerations to which the protective system leads.
The result of this struggle was that the tax on molasses was raised to 10 cents per gallon. The tax on
wool was put at 4 cents per pound and 40 per cent, to increase by 5 per cent annually until it was 50 per cent.
A $1.00 minimum was inserted in the scheme proposed at Harrisburgh, and a tax of 40 cents a square yard
was laid. This combination of taxes, resulting from political motives only, to favor the wool growers of the
Middle and Ohio States and not to make woolens dear to consumers in the same districts and in the South,
was exceedingly injurious to woolen manufacturers. You observe that it is not inhuman ingenuity to inter-
pose in the delicate relations of trade by arbitrary enactments without doing damage. On account of these
features of the tariff in regard to molasses and woolens it got only 16 votes from New England (in the House)
to 23 against it.
The tax on bar iron, not rolled, was raised to $22.40 per ton; if rolled, $37 per ton. Hemp was raised to
$45 per ton. These features, with the tax on wool, gained the force which carried the bill in the house, 105 to
94. On the final vote, there were in the affirmative 61 Adams and 44 Jackson votes; in the negative, 35
Adams and 59 Jackson votes. The South, after putting the “abominations” in the bill, voted against it, except
three votes. To show the want of good faith, it is significant to notice that, on the motion for the previous
question, 11 Adams and 99 Jackson men voted in the affirmative, and 80 Adams and 11 Jackson men in the
negative.
All the New England men, and all the bona fide tariff men like Niles were disatisfied with this bill, and
began at once to agitate for its amendment. It has been customary lor the tariff advocates to speak of it as a
good bill, which only needed some slight “adjustments.” We see, I think, if we look at it candidly, the very
best proof that such adjustments are required forever, that is, that they are impossible. It is a specimen of the
purest quackery in legislation. I think it shows also that the only petition any sober business man can ever34 / William Graham Sumner
address to the Legislature is to “let him alone” and, if possible, not legislate about his affairs at all In this
very debate of 1828, Mr. Stevenson, of Pennsylvania, arguing for the tariff, said: “If legislation were as
intelligent as commerce is vigilant, much national evil might be avoided.” I could only improve this by
saying: “If it were perceived that legislation never can be as intelligent as commerce is vigilant, far more
national evil would be avoided.”
The agitation of the Northern protectionists, for the amendment of the tariff, sank into insignificance in
comparison with the discontent which the tariff caused in the South. The South was, of course, crippled by
slavery, but it is undeniable that the complaint the Southerners made was just and well founded. They sold in
a free market and bought in a protected one. They claimed that they had inherited the grievances of the
colonies at the revolution, and that they stood just where the colonists had stood at that time; asking why
they should maintain a political connection in which the taxing power was abused for their oppression.
When they were told that they must yield to the welfare of the whole, they replied that this was England’s old
argument that the colonies should bow to imperial considerations. Thus the tariff controversy, pushed to
extremes by the power of the majority, and in disregard of the pleas of the minority for justice, assailed our
political system in its most delicate and most vital part—the integrity of the confederation. The attempt of
South Carolina to nullify the tariff act was not open disunion and secession. It was worse. It was an attempt
to remain in the Union and yet reduce the confederation to imbecility and contempt. Thus forty years after
the first tariff with its 8 per cent import on dutiable, we find that the system had steadily advanced, that the
infant industries were as feeble and clamorous as ever, that the burden had been increased until it was now
equal to 41 per cent that it had been elaborated into a system in which the lobby had been trained and
educated, that it had corrupted politics and furnished capital for political schemes, that it had, on the testi-
mony of those interested, done them no good, and that it had brought the confederation face to face with its
greatest danger, that of disruption.Lecture V: Vacillation of the Protection Policy in this
Country.— Conclusion.
At the point which I have now reached, in my review of the history of protection in the United States, it is
necessary to observe that the original prejudice of the Americans in favor of liberty of every kind had been
crashed ont as regards trade. The frequent changes of the tariff had educated the generation which had grown
up since the second war to the dogmas and fallacies of protection. These had been preached assiduously by
Niles and Carey, and being plausible and popular, and falling in with national prejudices, they had gained
great currency. There had, indeed, been no argument for the other side. We are familiar with the fact that a
special interest finds ardent advocates and energetic workers, while the public interest lacks defenders.
In 1829, Gondy Raguet commenced the publication of the Free Trade Advocate, in which he published
some of the best writing on financial and economic topics ever produced on this side the water. He wrote
above his readers, for whose minds Niles’ style and arguments were much better adapted, and his journal
soon expired. He continued his work in another journal, called the Banner of the Constitution, for some time
longer.
Another fact, which it is important to observe for a correct understanding of the movement in this
country towards protectionism, is the great prosperity which was enjoyed here from the second war until
1837. The advantages of the new country were, of course, enormous, and every improvement in transporta-
tion and every new invention tended to bring them within reach. The losses inflicted by a bad tariff belonged
in the great margin of what might have been. The people had not lost something which they once had. They
had fallen short of something which they might have possessed for the labor they had expended. This ia
something which people are slow to understand. Rob them of a good which they have possessed, or diminish
comforts to which they have been accustomed, and they feel it. They are slower to understand that a given
amount of labor might have produced, under a given condition of society, a certain result, and that they have
fallen short of it. Such, however, is the correct statement of the effect of any tariff system, and the American
people have always been slow to understand it, because they have enjoyed so much, and have been growing
in comfort so steadily, that they could almost afford to be indifferent to something still better.
In 1830, this prosperity was pointed to in vindication of the tariff system, and with great popular effect.
The fact was that the circumstances were so favorable that legislation could only lessen, not cripple, the
advantages, but it was said that the tariff had caused all the prosperity, and hence the argument was: Let us
have more. In the session if 1830–31 some efforts were made to strengthen the tariff of 1828. For instance,
it was proposed to repeal the provision that the tax on salt should be reduced from 10 to 5 cents, January 1,
1832, and to raise it to 15 cents.36 / William Graham Sumner
In the fall of 1831, two national conventions, one of protectionists and one of free traders, were held.
The free traders met at Philadelphia, September 30, and published a clear and sound address, setting forth
the simple principles, which are all mere truisms, and must rely on common sense for their effect. The effect
seems to have been very slight. The Tariff convention met at New York, Oct. 26. It published an address, and
appointed committees to collect and publish “reports” on various industries. The address consisted of bad
political economy and the usual special pleas to bar the common sense application of simple principles. As
a specimen, I quote a single sentence : “Nations are adversary to each other. Their commercial intercourse is
regulated by treaties always made with a view to relative advantages, and to provide for those hostilities
which are of perpetual occurrence.” The “reports” offered jumbled and immaterial statistics about amounts
prodnced and amounts imported, and had their corner-stone in one on “ the balance of trade” view of the
currency. They all talk of the calamity of buying without selling, an operation which we are accustomed to
call, in the rare cases when we experience it, receiving presents, and they go into hysterics about the damage
endured from foreigners who send their surplus stocks here and sacrifice them at auction, which is only
declaiming against cheapness.
In the session of 1831–2, a presidential election approaching, the whole subject came up again. The
Committee on Ways and Means presented a majority and minority report, with bills. The Committee on
Manufactures proposed a high tariff revision. The Secretary of the Treasury reported a more moderate bill.
The Senate also had a bill There were also numerous amendments. The result was a remodeled tariff ad-
justed to suit the protective policy, signed July 14, 1832.
This, then, was the answer to Southern protests. The Southern position was doubly unfortunate. In the
first place, they insisted on the unconstitutionally of the tariff, and sought nullification as a remedy. This
complicated their position with the most difficult and vital constitutional questions. In the second place, they
did not fight intelligently for free trade, nor yet for a revenue tariff. They wanted a “horizontal tariff,” and ad
valorem duties. South Carolina called a convention in November, 1832, and persisted in movements towards
nullifying the tariff. The President met them with a proclamation setting forth his duty and intentions. Con-
gress met again in that year with the question of tariff in the first place of interest. A bill introduced by Mr.
Verplanck was intended to conciliate. Many and serious amendments altering its character were introduced,
and the whole winter was spent in struggles over them. Suddenly, near the end of the session, Mr. Clay
proposed another bill to supersede them all. Mr. Calhoun had quarreled with the President, and had been
thrown into opposition, and he and Mr. Clay arranged the compromise under circumstances which are dif-
ferently stated by different authorities. The day before that on which the Act of July was to go into operation,
March 2, 1833, this compromise tariff was signed by the President. It provided that the taxes fixed by the
tariff of 1832, so far as the ad valorem rates exceeded twenty per cent should be reduced by one-tenth of the
excess over twenty per cent, on the first of January in each alternate year until 1841. In that year they were
to be reduced one-half of the remaining excess, and in 1842, were to be reduced to twenty per cent. This
would issue, of course, in a horizontal tariff at that rate. This bill also shortened the period of credits on
imports, and raised the custom house valuation of the sovereign to $4.80. The reduction operated only
slowly. It started from the stringent high tariff of 1832, and the “horizontal” tariff had no principle of protec-
tion, or free trade, or revenue in it. The compromise was a pure political makeshift, in which the public and
private interests had no consideration.
Now, one looks with great interest through the history of the subsequent years to see if manufactures
died out. One expects lugubrious descriptions of disasters from the protectionist journals. Nothing of this
kind, however, is to be found. Niles drops his long essays. The subject disappears from his columns. No
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put the question aside, the manufacturers ceased to carry on their business in the lobby, but attended to it at
home. They probably found this more profitable. At any rate they prospered, and the whole country pros-
pered steadily until the currency errors came in once more to produce disaster.
The panic of 1837, and the bank crash of 1839, spread ruin throughout the country. This is not the place
to speak of the causes or relations of this disaster. Suffice it to say, that great amounts of capital had been
invested here by Europeans during the last decade, and that a vast indebtedness had been incurred on a bank
inflation. The capital had been largely invested in internal improvements carried on by a kind of mania.
These works were often unwisely undertaken and extravagantly conducted. They offered no promise of
profit. Correctly regarded, however, this disaster was the result of rash and ignorant abase of exuberant
natural advantages, but the abuse had been so excessive that the revulsion was terrible, and the country did
not recover for five years.
I take no account here of the various attempts which were made during the period of the compromise to
alter the duties, either directly or under the form of bills to secure the collection of the revenue. It is sufficient
to say that there were several such attempts, and that the compromise did not run its course without signs of
the old longing to legislate on this subject. The last years of the period, when the duties were lowest, fell in
with the distress of 1837 to 1842. The old argument of “hard times,” therefore came up with renewed force
in favor of more protection. People did not see that when a country like this, enjoying the greatest natural
advantages, suffers distress, it is proof positive that artificial and legislative arrangements must have inter-
fered injuriously with the play of natural laws. I cannot too strenuously insist upon this, in view of present
circumstances. The soil of the earth furnishes the necessaries and comforts of life when man applies labor
and capital to get them out of it. If one man has much land at his disposal, he can get abundance with little
labor. He pays all the persons engaged in manufactures, trade, transportation and personal services out of his
abundance, for saving him from loss, or doing part of his work for him, or contributing to his comfort and
advantage. This is a simple statement of the economic organization of modern society. It regulates itself
perfectly. The natural laws, the law of value, the law of exchange, the principle of free contract, are suffi-
cient to keep the whole system in harmonious operation. If the resources of the soil are inadequate to the
demands, either because population is excessive or the soil poor, the way of escape is by emigration or an
improvement in the arts; but if the soil is rich, and the population meager, and yet there is distress, the place
to look for the causes is in the artificial arrangements of man. We must have misapprehended the laws of
nature which govern economic circumstances, and put our legislative enactments out of joint with them. The
way out of trouble lies in a closer study of the science of economy, and a more correct adjustment of our
arrangements to the laws which it teaches. The general custom of man is, however, to try to correct one bad
arrangement by another, to put another cog, or another lever, or another spring, into the machine, never
remembering that he thus simply increases the friction, and lessens the force which he had before. It has long
been generally known that we cannot invent a perpetual motion, because it is making something out of
nothing, but in social and economic arrangements, analogous efforts are still continually made. So it was in
1842. Distress prevailing, it was supposed to be the business of government to remove distress. What else, it
was asked, did government exist for? It was a paternal, fostering institution. To be sure, the persons who
composed it as individuals, enjoyed, with a few exceptions, but little respect. The functions which legiti-
mately belonged to government were notoriously ill-performed. It did worse, and at far greater expense,
whatever it tried to do, than any person or corporation in the country. If it possessed any occult force, or any
superior intelligence, or any improved machinery for getting what men want in this world, it certainly kept
it secret and produced uo proofs of it. Yet the superstition of government, then and still strong amongst us,
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economy.
The whigs entertained the general conception that government demeaned itself when it narrowed its
own functions. They believed in the paternal theory. They scorned all the notions which had prevailed in the
government for twelve years, and, having won a victory in 1840, they were eager to put their own theory in
practice. They passed a bill for distributing the proceeds of the public lands amongst the States, thus strip-
ping the government of a legitimate source of revenue; but it was provided that this distribution should not
take place when duties were above twenty per cent. At the next session (1842) they passed a provisional
tariff with a clause repealing the limitation on distribution, but it was vetoed by Mr. Tyler. They then passed
a permanent tariff, which he also vetoed; both on account of the repeal of the limitation on distribution. They
then passed the tariff of August 30th, 1842, raising duties and cutting off distribution. This act turned back to
protection. It was based on the tariff of 1832, but the duties were lower. The reviving industries of the
country, consequent on the destruction of the bad currency, and the restoration of sound values, were pointed
at as proofs of the success of this policy.
The arguments employed at this period offer nothing new. The notion, so prevalent in 1832, that high
tariffs lower prices, and which was then affirmed as a broad and general truth, was little heard in 1842. The
grounds put forward at the latter date were the old and worn out fallacies about imports and exports, balance
of trade, drain of specie, &c., &c. A specimen from the report of the Committee on Manufactures may
suffice : “There are several causes for the present depression of property and general stagnation of business,
one of which will be admitted to be the large amount of our importations over the amount of exports. This
depresses our home industry and draws from the country annually large balances in specie, crippling our
banks and depriving them of the power to grant necessary facilities.” A great part of the public documents of
the United States consist in a reiteration and expansion of this paragraph, every clause of which contains
errors which are refuted in any standard elementary text book on political economy. The importations can-
not exceed the exportations over any period of time. If they do for a time, it is proof that they ought to, and
it cannot produce any stagnation in business. If imported articles drive home manufactures out of the mar-
ket, it only proves that the people are getting their supplies cheaper, and that that particular form of home
industry is falling behind in the industrial race. We have only the alternative of letting the persons interested
do as we all have to do, employ energy and skill to sustain themselves, or else rob ourselves to protect them
in inferiority—that is to subsidize negligence, inefficiency and want of skill. The importations cannot “draw
away specie” unless we part with it willingly; and if we do, we give up what is worth less for what is worth
more. “We cannot be robbed of specie except by an invading army, and if we give it np in trade, we give it
up for a profit. No sound bank, which has not by its excessive issnes injured commerce and industry, can be
“crippled” by an export of specie, and such an export is the proper protection of the public against the injury
which excessive bank issues are doing. As for lessening the power of the banks to “grant necessary facili-
ties,” the committee are under that notion of banks which regards them as beneficent institutions whose
function is to create capital for people who want it.
By the election of Polk in 1844 the South gained control of the government. In 1845 the cry was raised
that the tariff was in danger. Meetings were held to protest against any change. The project of Mr. Walker,
Secretary of the Treasury, was the old southern plan of horizontal rates and ad valorem duties. He divided
nearly all imports into eight schedules with duties at 100, 40, 30, 25, 20, 15, 10 and 5 per cent ad valorem.
This bill passed the Honse 114 to 94, and the Senate 28 to 27, after a debate and a public excitement,
different in kind but scarcely less in degree than that of 1832. The average rate of duty under it was 25½ per
cent on dutiable, until 1857. By the Act of March 3, 1857, the duties were lowered to an average rate of 20¼
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The period from 1846 to 1860 was our period of comparative free trade. The Sub-Treasury Act of 1846
removed subjects of currency and banking from national legislation. Thus these two topics were for a time
laid aside. For an industrial history of the United States, no period presents greater interest than this. It was
a period of very great and very solid prosperity. The tariff was bad and vexations in many ways, if we regard
it from the standpoint either of free trade or revenue tariff, but its rates were low and its effects limited. It
was called “a revenue tariff with incidental protection.” The manufactures which, it had been said, would
perish, did not perish, and did not gain sudden and exorbitant profits. They made steady and genuine progress.
The repeal of the English corn laws in 1846 opened a large market for American agricultural products, and
took away the old argument which Niles and Carey had used with such force, that England wanted other
countries to have free trade, but would not take their products. The effect on both countries was most happy.
It seemed as if the old system was gone forever, and that these two great nations, with free industry and free
trade, were to pour increased wealth upon each other. The fierce dogmatism of protection and its deeply-
rooted prejudices seemed to have undergone a fatal blow. Out-shipping rapidly increased. Our cotton crop
grew larger and larger. The discovery of gold in California added mightily to the expansion of prosperity.
The states indeed repeated our old currency follies, and the panic of 1857 resulted, but it was only a stumble
in a career of headlong prosperity. We recovered from it in a twelvemonth. Slavery agitation marked this
period politically, and if people look back to it now they think most of that; but industrially and economi-
cally, and I will add also, in the administration of the government, the period from the Mexican to the civil
war is our golden age, if we have any. There was simplicity, even to dullness, in national affairs. It was one
of those happy periods when a nation has little history. As far as the balance of trade is concerned, it never
was more regular and equal than in this period.
The Act of March 3, 1857, was called for, because the revenue had risen beyond the necessities of the
government, and the debt had been reduced to an insignificant sum. The bill lowered duties about one
quarter, and applied especially to raw materials of manufacture. In the debate, however, strong opposition to
it was aroused, and no little old protectionism was called out. The West objected to the reduction on raw
materials, especially wool, hemp and lead, which they produced, and threatened to resist the incidental
protection to Eastern manufactures. This brought out the weakness and error of incidental protection in
strong light. So long as there is any protection the argument is sure to arise under this form. Those who are
not protected demand that revenue be raised from products similar to theirs in order to give them a share in
the incidental benefit. In short we are forced either to protect all or to protect none, and we see distinctly that
there is no safe position to take except that of total opposition to all protection. If we lay any duties which act
protectively, we must offset them by excise taxes, that no benefit may accrue.
Congress was divided in 1857 between two policies for the reduction of revenue, and was embarrassed
by a novel difficulty in legislation, that of getting rid of a surplus which threatened worse demoralization
than any public debt. It was then fully perceived that by reducing taxes revenue was increased. The tariff of
‘46 had been estimated to yield about twenty millions. The receipts from it in 1856 were over sixty millions.
It was therefore urged that, to reduce revenue, duties ought to be raised and used for protection.
The panic of 1857, of course, reduced imports and lessened revenue. In 1858 there was a recovery,
which was still greater in 1859. In 1860 political troubles produced another reduction. The expenses of the
government in the meantime increased and a deficit arose. This formed the basis for the new effort to
increase duties. The real motive, however, was political. The Republican party wanted to make sure of
Pennsylvania. That state was aware of its value to the Union and to the party in question. As a member of the
Confederation, no one would have esteemed it less than any other, but it was still in the position of a member
of the family who wants to live on the contributions of the others. It added to the incongruity of the situation40 / William Graham Sumner
that this member claimed to be possessed of means of wealth surpassing all the others, but he could not get
a living out of them. He would not be idle either, but insisted on sinking capital in unproductive enterprises
and calling on his brethren to make np his losses.
The Republican party made the bargain. Mr. Morrill introduced his tariff in the House, March 12th,
1860, and it was passed. The Senate postponed it to the next session. In June, the Chicago Convention
adopted a tariff plank. The bill came up at the next session and passed the Senate February 20th, 1861, by a
vote of 25 to 14, seven Southern States having, up to that time, seceded. The bill passed the House promptly
by a large vote, and was signed March 2d, 1861. It went into operation April 1st. It raised duties from the
tariff of 1857 about one-third. The debate hinged upon revenue almost entirely and showed the result of
fourteen years’ education in comparative free trade.
This fact is well worth observing. Ten to fifteen years suffice to change the voting population and to
educate a generation in one set of ideas or another. Thus the traditions of one policy secure a certain stability
within that period and men lose memory of any other. It is always difficult for men to realize in imagination,
or by description, a social condition other than that they have experienced. The power to do this is only
acquired by study and travel. Hence it is to-day that most people acquiesce in the paper money and protec-
tionist fallacies to which we have, as a generation, become accustomed.
The Morrill tariff does not call for any extended notice, because it only lasted four months. A new act
became a law on August 5th, 1861, which raised duties from the date of its passage. It was a revenue act, but
contained many protectionist jobs. The immediate result was that it produced effects on trade which legisla-
tors, inexperienced in this department and ignorant of the laws of taxation, did not foresee, and it stimulated
numberless efforts to secure for other “interests” similar advantages. Another act of December 24th, 1861,
increased the taxes on tea, coffee and sugar.
In 1862 the internal taxes were laid. They were extended from time to time without method or intelli-
gence, but they proved conclusively enough that that system of taxation is perfectly feasible in this country,
and that, on a system adjusted to the best modern principles of taxation, it could be used here as well or better
than anywhere else in the world. It was unpopular and produced grumbling, which is one of its chief recom-
mendations, because people knew what they were paying, and they were guarded against the apathy which
characterizes them in regard to import duties. The latter are far more mischievous, but are paid uncon-
sciously. The time will come, in the advance of enlightenment, when men will demand to be allowed to
conduct their business in entire freedom, so as to make as much as they can, and then pay taxes which they
must pay out of the net proceeds, and when they would as soon let the grocer and butcher draw on their bank
accounts without presenting a bill, as let the government put its hands in their pockets for taxes when they do
not know it It would be an amusing experiment if this government «honld for a year exact by internal taxes
without duties the same sum which the tariff now costs us, and then pay in bounties to the protected interests
the sum which they now get.
The Act of July 14, 1862, raised duties “temporarily.” The joint resolution of April 29th, 1864, raised
all duties fifty per cent for sixty days, afterwards extended to ninety. The Act of June 30th, 1864, was a
general revision for revenue and protection. It was represented as “a necessary offset to the internal duties
and as a temporary war tariff. The Act of March 3d, 1865, again extended and complicated the system by
more minute subdivisions and classifications and by enhanced rates. It involved a number of tricks and
devices intended to have an effect which could not be foreseen, and was a reckless exertion of the powers
which had been rediscovered as latent in this kind of legislation. The Act of July 28th, 1866, revised and
strenghtened the last act, by various provisions intended to clinch its operation.
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attention was absorbed in that direction. Congress itself was so absorbed in this business that the questions
involved in tariff did not obtain consideration. The necessity of getting revenue was paramount, and there
was no scientific knowledge of the principles of taxation to govern the attempt. The only system employed
was to tax everything, and if more revenue was wanted, to tax more heavily. The people submitted patrioti-
cally, because they thought it necessary. The abundance of paper money, with rising prices and great specu-
lation, created enormous fortunes and produced a semblance of prosperity. People thought that millions of
men could leave industry and go to destroying capital, and yet the nation get rich. Under such circumstances
the natural consequence was that the social parasites found a grand opportunity. We must distinguish here
two kinds of protection; the doctrinaire protection of Clay, Niles, Carey and Greelev, which was bona fide
belief in the doctrine as a theory of national wealth, and the interested protection of cliques and individuals,
who employ the system only for selfish ends. The latter was the kind which arose here ten years ago and
under which we are now living. We enjoyed the services, as national legislators, of Mr. Morrell and Mr.
Stevens, Pennsylvania iron masters; Mr. McCarthy, for the New York Salt Works; Mr. Morrill, for the
Vermont sheep raisers. Our Congress was beset by lobbyists, who found it easier to speculate by moving
legislation than by cornering the market; and to look at our legislation it seemed that we were a confedera-
tion only for the sake of holding a grand scramble at Washington to see which section and which interest
should worst plunder the rest.
The system was elaborated as a “temporary” system—as a war measure—like the paper money, and
we have been living under it ever since. Too many people find their interest in sustaining it to let it fall
without a struggle, on behalf of the great public which elects all the Congressmen, but finds few representa-
tives. The internal taxes, which formed the excuse for a large part of the advance in duties have been gradu-
ally abolished, and the whole weight of destructive restraint is left to fall on the industries of the country.
Evidently the whole policy was erroneous and false, even from the point of view adopted. In going into a
great war, the nation wanted its powers free. It wanted cheapness and abundance then, if ever. It wanted the
maximum of revenue according to the most approved methods of obtaining it. It was no time to re-undertake
the task of encouraging industries, even if that ever was wise, and I believe that the historian, when he comes
to criticise this period in our history, will say that the welfare of a great nation never was so recklessly
sacrificed by ignorant empiricism in legislation, nor the patriotism of a great people ever so wantonly abused,
as in the tariff legislation of our war. Our position then and since as to tariff and paper money always
reminds me of one of the blessings of Jacob: “Issachar is a strong ass, bowed down between two burdens.
And he saw that rest was good, and the land that it was pleasant, and bowed his shoulders to bear, and
became a servant unto tribute.”
I come now, however, to the most shameful chapter in the whole story. In 1867, the woolen manufac-
turers being dissatisfied with the protection they enjoyed, held a convention at Syracuse to exert the influ-
ence which was due to the importance of their industry on legislation. Upon their arrival, they met with an
unexpected obstacle. Lo! there were also the representatives of the wool-growers. These latter had come to
watch and to say that they must be counted in. Obviously, the path of wisdom lay in an alliance. An adjust-
ment to satisfy the wool-growers was made, and the tax on woolens was put enough higher to allow for this.
The tariff there concocted was enacted into a law March 2d, 1867. It consisted of a minute classification, and
a complicated graduated rate which has tormented the woolen industry ever since. In 1868 and 1869, we saw
mutton a drug on the market at 8 aud 9 cts., when beef was 20. The farmers who had been deluded into
relying on tariffs to produce wealth, found that they had to send their sheep to slaughter.
The woolen interest profited no better. They had to import dirt from Australia when they wanted wool.
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higher rate of duty exacted, and the importation unprofitable. When they turned to the home supply they
found that it was all on one grade, and that they were deprived of the advantage of mixing wools to make
various fabrics. Mills were started by ignorant and inexperienced persons in improper places, and the supply
of cloth, all on one grade, glutted the market In 1869 a crisis in the industry occurred, with numerous failures.
Mills were sold out for a fraction of their cost. New proprietors started, with a smaller capital account, and
there has since been nothing but a struggling and unremunerative existence for this industry.
In 1870 the first reduction of duties took place, and it was on the debate of this bill that the old diver-
gence as to the principle of protection reappeared. The sections and interests were so completely included in
the system that there was little clear,complete and outspoken advocacy of free trade, such as the South used
to offer. Almost every member had a reservation in favor of the interest of his own district. It only proves
again that the system must be assailed as a whole. Pig iron was reduced from $9 to $7 per ton. The other
reductions were chiefly on tea, coffee, sugar, spices, wines and fruits, things which ought to bear taxes if
anything does. In 1872, 10 per cent was taken from the duty on some of the most important articles in the
tariff, but the amount was restored in the session of 1874–5, by what was called the “little tariff” bill. The
tariff now contains 1,500 articles and specifications. In 1874 the average rate was equivalent to 38½ per cent
on dutiable imports.
In the mean time American shipping had ceased to be. Other nations bought shipping and sailed it at a
profit, if they could not build it. We prohibited this. Nevertheless, under even this utmost exertion of the
restrictive system, the revival of our shipping, longingly looked for and often promised, never came. Our
flag is kept afloat by one or two subsidized lines, and by one on a course which other shipowners have
abandoned as unprofitable. Perhaps the Pacific Mail Line enlists the pride of Americans. From time to time
it is proposed to go on and subsidize ships, in order to force the long-desired revival. This is consistent at
least. Having taxed tonnage in foreign trade out of existence, forbidden the transfer of foreign built ships to
American registers in order to spite the shipowners who abandoned our flag during the war, we now propose
to tax agriculture and commerce back again to provide a fund for subsidizing ships.
Our exports have likewise been killed by the inevitable operation of the tariff. We no longer offer a
market and cannot attract miscellaneous orders. We cannot export to countries whose products we do not
take. We cannot trade directly with South America, the East Indies, or Australia, even for the exports in
which we could doubtless compete in those markets, because we refuse to take their products. We cannot
make round voyages because no one could tell what would be done with the tariff at home during the interval
which must elapse. Our manufacturers having secured the home market, find that the home market becomes
a restraint, not an advantage, and they move out of the country in order to get rid of the trammels of the tariff
while working for export. Our own sewing machines are provided for foreign nations cheaper than we can
get them ourselves. The system has been pushed so far, and its complicated developments have become so
interlocked with each other that the protective system is to-day a dead weight on all the production of the
country of every kind. Its complete overthrow would be a grand emancipation for manufactures as.well as
for everything else.
How far we yet are from anything like this movement was shown a few weeks ago by the proposition
gravely made, and, it appears, gravely entertained at Washington, to lay discriminating duties so as to bear
on the civil war in the Island of Cuba. The taxing power is the greatest engine controlled by governments,
and it has been used or abused to aid temperance, to restrain luxury, to put down slavery (the English dis-
criminating duties on slave-grown sugar), to coerce belligerents in favor of neutrals, and, in this last case, is
proposed to accomplish an interference in a foreign struggle with which we could not interfere justifiably in
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This completes the hasty review which I have been able, under the circumstances, to give of the history
of our tariff legislation. Some things seem to follow from it so evidently that no one can contradict them.
In the first place this notion that there is some means to increase, by an adjustment of taxes, the wealttt
of a country has had a very full trial amongst us. It was inherited by us from older countries, in which the
pressure of population on the means of subsistence was great, and the idea of the functions of government
wide. It was hostile to all the beliefs and habits of thought of the American people. It was totally incongruous
with the social and political system which they established. It was reluctantly admitted under the idea that a
new country may need some stimulus and assistance at the outset. In this view it is forgotten that the stimu-
lus mast come from without to be of any use, and that, if it is sought within, it can only be obtained by
depressing one part to develop another. Nothing is created by the system, nor ever can be. It is only another
instance of the folly which we continually commit of trying to make something out of nothing, or to lift
ourselves by our bootstraps. As I have shown, the curtailment and depression fell in the United States on
agriculture. In England it fell on manufactures for the benefit of agriculture, and in any country, old or new,
the doctrine holds absolutely, that whatever means of wealth it has, and whatever the kind may be, they work
up to their maximum when they work freely.
The Americans adopted the notion, however, that they could, by a few years of self-denial, get certain
industries started, which would then “go alone” and become independent sources of wealth. I not only affirm
on the grounds of reason and science that such a theory is absurd and fallacious, but I now appeal to the
century of history as a complete proof that there is something wrong and false about this theory. Where are
the results? Instead of strong, independent industries, we have to-day only a hungry and clamorous crowd of
“infants.” We are told that our country is rich in everything good for man, and every new discovery of
natural sources of wealth is made the ground, not of greater abundance and less labor, but of greater scarcity
and greater labor. Find a mine of copper in the United States, and it is an argument for making it harder for
the people of the United States to get copper than before. We used to get emery to supply all our wants by
giving wheat and cotton for it; we did not know we had any. At length a bed of ore was found in Massachu-
setts, and the first step was to get legislation to make the American people give more wheat and tobacco for
emery than before. The same applies to all our great resources, until it might be worth while to calculate how
much more iron, coal, copper and lead the people of the United States would have to-day, if there was not a
particle of either under their soil, than they now possess. There is immense force, apparently, in the fallacy
that we want “industries,” when in fact we want goods to supply our needs; in the idea that we want work,
when in fact we want leisure. We are trying to sustain life on the face of the earth, and we find it hard work.
All our discoveries and inventions have for their object to make it easier; that is, to get more goods for the
same labor, and to sustain more, or more highly developed, men. For this we want leisure from drudgery, as
the first and most imperative requisite. Therefore, everything which gets the goods and lessens the labor is
an advance in civilization; and everything which makes more labor necessary to get the goods tends to
barbarism. Labor for material good is simply a gross necessity, which we are all the time trying to conquer
in order to get leisure for pleasanter and higher occupation, and, above all else, it follows that those whose
lives are all spent in drudgery over material needs are most clogged in their efforts for emancipation by
everything which increases labor. Hence this aim with which the early American statesmen set out has
proved a chimera. The further we follow it, the further it leads us. We get more industry and less good.
It follows, secondly, from this history that this continual law-making about industry has been prolific
of industrial and political mischief. It has tainted our political life with log-rolling, presidential wire-pulling,
lobbying and custom house politics. It has been intertwined with currency errors all the way along. It has
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business to which the rest of us are liable. It has controlled the election of Congressmen, and pat inferior men
in office, whose inferiority has reacted upon the nation in worse and worse legislation. Just now we are
undergoing a spasm of indignation at official corruption, and we want to reform the civil service, but there is
only one way to accomplish that, and that is to cnt np the whole system which has made the civil service
what it is. It is of little use to cut off the tops of the weeds and leave the roots in the ground. When the shower
passes over they will grow up stouter than ever.
I have presented the subject to yon historically, because it is the method of treatment in which I have
the most confidence. It is to history that we must look for the facts which teach us social and economic laws,
and form the basis of any positive treatment of social questions. For a full exposition it would be necessary
to follow the industrial history of the country, but the materials for such a history of this country are not in a
shape to be available, if indeed they exist We have enough, however, to show us that we are living here under
immutable and inexorable laws of the social organization. We cannot cheat those laws, nor evade them. If
we try to escape their operation in one point, they avenge themselves in another. We cannot manipulate the
law of value, so as to make things exchange otherwise than in the ratio of supply and demand, without losing
more one way than we gain another. We cannot legalize plunder under any guise whatever, without surely
wasting wealth and impoverishing robbers and robbed together. We cannot arrange any system of gambling
which will increase wealth, since wealth comes only from labor properly applied. We cannot employ the
taxing power of the government to increase wealth, but only to diminish it. This is the world and human life
as they are. The whole protectionist school, in its various grades, starts out with discontent with this world,
and with a priori assumption in regard to the kind of world they would like to make. They are not contented
to see what the natural chances of the country are and then to go to work to develop them. They make up their
minds first what, in their wisdom, the country ought to be, and then they set to work to force it, with nature
or against nature, into that form. They are not contented to see that the country affords by nature unexampled
opportunities for man in agriculture and commerce. That is all as nothing if it cannot he one other thing also.
They are not satisfied that it shall evidently be able to obtain all good things which the whole world produces
by exchange, if not by production. They form to themselves dogmas about exchange, and will have nothing
bnt by direct production, even though on the whole they have less. So they set to work to devise means to
make the sort of country which they picture to themselves. We all sometimes grumble at the ills of life, I
suppose; but I, for one, turn back from the study of all these propositions with devout thankfulness that we
live in a world which God has made, and that these gentlemen may mar, but they cannot greatly alter it; and,
looking back on our experience of what they have done for us, I think we may all submit gladly to things as
they are in preference to the notions of Niles and Carey as to what they ought to be. This is a world in which
toil is the road to wealth. It is a world in which industry, economy, prudence, temperance, are sure roads to
health, wealth, comfort and happiness, if men will only leave those virtues to operate freely under the laws
which are set for human life. It is a world in which idleness, extravagance, dissipation and want of thrift are
sternly and piteously punished; unless men, by their laws, rob virtue of its rewards to transfer them to vice.
That is all which any “protection” ever can do, and it is the worst injustice which law can perpetrate. It is the
injustice of the old despotisms and caste aristocracies, and of all systems of class legislation and privilege,
an injustice which has made history one long record of revolutions and social wars and broils and tumults.
We may perpetrate it over again in the name of democracy, but we may be sure we shall only produce the
same results. What is lacking in it is liberty, and in spite of the boasts of men about liberty, we are very far
yet from understanding what it it. It is nothing but the removal of all restraints which hinder any individual
from exercising all his powers under the best intelligence, to go towards happiness by the path of virtue
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and ignorantly, choose the path of vice, which leads to ruin. When we plead for liberty we plead only that
those of us who want to choose the course of prosperity and solid security may be left free to do so, or at
least, that we may not be burdened in the attempt. When we ask for the liberty to exchange our products as
we will, we ask only that, in that one particular, our efforts to advance ourselves may be left free to exert
their full effect.
This brings us then face to face with the task which is at present incumbent upon us. We must have
recourse to the means which are familiar to the habits of our people. We must organize societies and diffuse
information. We must meet and discuss, and seek to gain and to propagate sound ideas. Our own welfare and
that of our children depends upon it. If we are to have a fight, and we may expect that the whole cohort of
selfish interests will make a strong stand for the control they have gained, we must meet it. The appeal lies
to the great agricultural interest, which is the chief sufferer, and which numbers one-half of all the popula-
tion of the country engaged in any occupation. The beginnings may be small and not very encouraging, but
there is immense faith to be placed in sound and true doctrine when it is fairly and plainly taught, and it is
impossible that a system of legislation so shameful and ignorant as our present tariff legislation can long
disgrace a free country.